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OPERATIONAL AUDIT of the DETENTION FACILITIES of the SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT



COUNTY OF FRESNO

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**PREPARED BY
COUNTY ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
MAY 1977**

Fresno county, Sheriff's Department,
Prison administration -- CA -- Fresno Co.
Fresno county -- Correctional institutions

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Organization of Report

As a result of our operational audit review, 31 findings containing 79 recommendations have been prepared. For readability and continuity, findings have been grouped into eight sections based upon their similarity of subject matter:

1. Bureau Organization
2. Employee Job Duties and Policies
3. Training of Employees
4. Correctional Officer Turnover Rate and Morale
5. Inmate Health and Welfare
6. Inmate Booking and Tracking
7. Physical Security
8. Procedural Security

Each finding consists of up to seven sections:

- A Statement of Condition describing the setting in which the finding is generated.
- A Criteria portion stating what standards or guidelines were used to evaluate the existing condition.
- An Effect section indicating the effect of the variance between current condition and the criteria.
- A Cause statement indicating the underlying reason for the effect.
- A Recommendation showing steps needed to remedy the cause of the situation.
- In instances where the Sheriff had comments on certain findings, a Department Comment showing additional information or action to date.

-- A CAO Response was made to some Department Comments to clarify our point.

A list of recommendations with a suggested timetable for their implementation follows this summary. The list of recommendations includes estimated cost and probable length of time needed to implement each one.

A summary of the findings within each section of the report follows in the remainder of this introduction. For a more detailed review of the basis for each recommendation, the reader should refer to the particular findings in the main body of the report.

Bureau Organization

The Corrections Bureau is primarily organized along facility lines with major subdivisions by each of three 8 hour watches per day. Supervisory officers are only assigned by watch, all sharing responsibility and authority for facility performance with little delineation of individual responsibilities. The Bureau and Jail commanders, in particular, have little resources designated by the organization to which they may delegate authority to handle and pinpoint responsibility for the administrative distractions they receive constantly. The Industrial Farm commander, due to the size of his staff, does not appear to have as great a problem planning and controlling the activities of his organization.

There is little Bureau command organization above the facility (division) level, consisting only of the commander and an administrative sergeant. The commander's responsibilities are also broadly defined. He sometimes feels he must assume direct supervision over aspects of facility operations. The Bureau commander recognizes his responsibility for planning and other essential top management concerns, but is frequently distracted by day to day operational considerations. This situation is aggravated by the physical location of his office within the Jail.

Bureau and facility commanders must reserve substantial amounts of their time to engage in the planning needed to cope with present and future demands upon the Bureau. This can be effectively accomplished

by delegating authority to certain subordinates they designate as responsible for carrying out specific, approved policies and programs. It may also be strengthened by setting aside some personnel resources to assist the Bureau commander in planning and programming activities.

In order for the Bureau to improve delegation and accountability, planning, and programming functions, it should be reorganized into a functional as well as watch oriented structure as depicted in Exhibit B of the report. No new Correctional Officer positions are needed to accomplish this reorganization.

Office space for the Bureau commander, and planning and programming lieutenants, should be provided outside the Jail facility to facilitate their performance of planning and control responsibilities. This should insulate them from day to day operational distractions.

The Department should clarify the responsibilities and specify the authority of Correctional Sergeants to increase their usefulness as part of the management team. The need to more fully utilize Correctional Sergeants is one of the most critical areas needing improvement. They could be more effective in training of subordinates, checking for errors and taking corrective action as appropriate. Responsibility for analyzing problems and developing solutions should be delegated to specific individuals. The following recommendations would also greatly increase the effectiveness of these positions and, consequently, significantly benefit detention facility operations: clarify sergeant responsibilities and authority; hold immediately lower command levels accountable; equitably delegate more assignments to sergeants; shift assignments based upon their skills and management needs; and locate the lieutenants in a separate office from the watch sergeants.

Supervisory clerical positions should be established to provide well trained and accountable supervision of Jail Records Clerks. Currently, supervision is provided by any on duty watch sergeant. This arrangement disperses responsibility and accountability, reduces continuity between watches and reduces morale and effectiveness of Jail Records Clerks.

The establishment of two supervisory clerical positions would ensure uniform use of current jail procedures and provide trained personnel

to be responsible for the clerical duties that are extremely important to the effective operation of the Jail. These personnel would also schedule Jail Records Clerks and be responsible for their performance.

There is a need for accurate and current statistics on jail activities and workload. Currently, only minimal statistics on jail population, bookings and releases and the number and cost of meals served are collected. The Industrial Farm has a statistical reporting system, but it needs to be reevaluated for the usefulness of information collected. Many possible types of information useful to the efficient and effective management of the detention facilities are not being collected and used by supervisory and management personnel. The Corrections Bureau should develop an explicit written policy setting forth its management information objectives and requirements, and then develop collection and summary mechanisms.

Employee Job Duties and Policies

The Corrections Bureau makes policy and procedures memoranda available for its employees to review. This effort to inform employees of proper procedures to follow in a wide variety of circumstances is important. Some modifications to the current format and distribution practices should enhance their usefulness. The memoranda should be issued on recognizable department forms, be consistently formatted, dated, indexed, periodically updated, and be more readily accessible to all Jail and Industrial Farm personnel.

The Corrections Bureau should compile a comprehensive employee manual and make it available to all employees. Several component parts of a comprehensive employee manual are already in existence or being developed. These include the Sheriff's Department policy manual, post assignment job descriptions, policy and procedures memoranda for the Corrections Bureau, Department of Corrections guidelines for local detention facilities and applicable California laws. Some of these reference documents are given to employees and some are available to employees if requested.

It is felt that in order to maximize their usefulness, these written guidelines should be developed into an employee manual and distributed to all employees and duty stations. Revisions should also be distributed in order to keep the copies current.

Training of Employees

Correctional Officers are required by Minimum Standards for Local Detention Facilities (California Administrative Code, Title 15, Section 1020) to receive a minimum of 40 hours of training in specified areas such as correctional history, security and emergency procedures, and laws and court decisions pertaining to local detention facilities. While these basic requirements are being satisfied, several areas of instruction were noted that could be improved. These areas include: more frequent classes so that Correctional Officers can be sent to the Basic Academy as soon after initial employment as possible; extra-help Correctional Officers and reservists attending the Basic Academy; the Sheriff continuing to encourage modification to the Basic Academy curriculum and stressing subjects necessary to the safety and performance of officers; increasing the use of field exercises and training aids; and evaluating new Correctional Officer performance to help establish what training is most needed in the Basic Academy and in service.

In addition to the basic training, Correctional Sergeants should be given supervisory training as are Deputy Sergeants. Also, Correctional Lieutenants should be sent to management training as are Deputy Lieutenants. These classifications are relatively new and have not yet been included in advanced training. Training in supervisory techniques and management responsibilities is necessary to establish a basis for uniform and effective utilization of corrections personnel.

Correctional Officer Turnover Rate and Morale

The Correctional Officer turnover rate shows a need to improve the County's ability to attract and retain qualified personnel for these positions. The Correctional Officer turnover rate of 19% should be reduced to a more acceptable level of 5 to 10%. This would result in less time and cost in recruiting, hiring and training new employees. We feel that recruitment should be more oriented toward individuals who want to pursue corrections as a career. In addition, Correctional Officers should be interviewed upon resigning to determine if modifications in recruitment efforts, training, or personnel procedures are needed. Correctional Officers should be evaluated at least annually to note performance deficiencies and develop remedial plans, or to commend exceptional performance.

The Corrections Bureau conducts probationary evaluations and is now developing a plan for periodic ongoing evaluations.

There is a feeling, shared by many Sheriff Deputies and Correctional Officers, that the importance of the Correctional Officer job is secondary or subordinate to that of the Deputies. This is attributed to practices in prior years when Deputies were assigned to the Jail for disciplinary reasons or training purposes, and more responsible jobs and supervisory positions were assigned to Deputies and the less responsible to Correctional Officers as the new class was phased into the Bureau. These conditions have been virtually eliminated with the phase in of Correctional Officers at the line and supervisory levels.

Many officers still feel the Deputy Sheriff job is superior because of compensation, challenge of the street environment, promotional opportunities, and public esteem for the law enforcement officer. As a result, many individuals have sought positions in the Corrections Bureau as a step in reaching entrance to a career in law enforcement. This low regard for a corrections career, both inside and outside the Bureau, can adversely affect the morale and performance of the detention facilities. Further, we suspect the basis for these negative value judgments about corrections is less real than imagined.

Historically, the corrections function was probably given inferior status, or at least a lower level of management attention, from the top management of the Sheriff's Department. The current administration has improved the situation considerably by showing interest in the Bureau, and by placing emphasis on solving the problems of the Bureau.

The Sheriff should continue to stress that the Corrections Bureau is an important, integral part of his Department. He should impress upon all personnel of the Department, including those of the Bureau, the significance each contributes to the varied missions of the Office of the Sheriff. His aggressive stance on this point, coupled with continuing attention to the resolution of the Bureau's problems, can accelerate the rise in the motivation level of Corrections Bureau employees.

The Department feels that most morale difficulties will be alleviated with the implementation of many of the recommendations in this report.

Changes in organization, supervision, better specification of responsibility and authority, and training should go far in improving employee motivation and job satisfaction.

Inmate Health and Welfare

The proper treatment of inmates to ensure compliance with nutritional standards, timely medical attention, and protection of inmate rights are genuine concerns of correctional personnel. We found management and employees interested in complying with applicable regulations and laws.

Most of our recommendations in this area are aimed at clarifying procedures and policies to ensure uniform and proper care of inmates. Recommendations include the review of the medication dispensing system; continuance of current food preparation procedures; a revised and more complete inmate correspondence plan; and a written policy of appropriate punishment for inmate rule violations.

Inmate Booking and Tracking

The procedures for booking, maintaining in-custody records, and release of inmates becomes very complex when dealing with several hundred prisoners. Each inmate is incarcerated for different charges; held for varying lengths of time; requires classification for security housing; and needs to be escorted for personal, medical, legal or court appointments. This constant receiving, moving and releasing process creates unique problems in maintaining accurate and current records of prisoner identity, whereabouts, and legal status. The Booking, Dispatch and Inmate Information offices are integral parts of this process of maintaining inmate status.

Additionally, the Inmate Information Office answers all public inquiries about the status of inmates and screens the release of prisoners. Daily, the office personnel also allow entry of numerous jail visitors such as attorneys and bondsmen.

The Inmate Information Office, because of its small size and inordinate number of requests for information, is in need of improved operating procedures and workspace. Remodeling plans for the office, which the Sheriff is already developing in cooperation with Public Works, should also be pursued for alteration funding during the 1977-78 fiscal year.

Other areas of concern include the need for a Booking area intercom to the outside sally port area; removing a potentially hazardous table in the Booking passageway; minimizing the presence of potentially armed officers in the pre-booking area; and better supervision of inmate phone use. Adoption of an improved inmate identification system is already being implemented. Suggested minor modifications to the beneficial inmate classification system include consideration of the expansion of classification to misdemeanor inmates and the need for printed information cards. Also, a complete review of the current in-custody and booking-release systems should be performed to determine if an automated system would be beneficial and feasible.

Physical Security

Specific physical security modifications to the Jail and additional safety equipment are recommended to ensure adequate safety of personnel and sufficient inmate security.

The inoperable sally port doors on the Booking area ramp should be replaced with sliding doors. The ramp doors at either end of the driveway are an overhead type, designed to roll down to the floor of the passageway to provide a security barrier. These doors are not operable because of accidents with transporting vehicles and have not been used for approximately two years. Because of this deficiency, the transfer of inmates between transporting vehicles and the prebooking cell is accomplished without the area being securely enclosed.

Sliding doors on the ramp would be more visible and durable than the existing overhead roll-up type and would minimize the possibility of accidental contact with a vehicle. Some warning device and safety equipment should also be installed to safely operate the doors and avert repeated damage. The cost of replacing the doors with sliding type doors is estimated to be comparable to repairing the existing ramp doors (approximately \$11,000). The installation of an electric eye and warning lights would also be beneficial in safely operating the door and averting damage (cost approximately \$3,000).

Currently safety helmets are not used by Correctional Officers in quelling disturbances in the Jail. The only available helmets are located in the Law Enforcement Administration Building. Those helmets are not well designed for combative situations in close quarters.

Approximately 15 helmets suitable for use in the Jail should be acquired for use by Correctional Officers on occasions when disturbances must be forceably terminated to protect inmates, staff, and County property.

The camera surveillance, intercom and buzzer system, and configuration of the "attorney interview room" need to be redesigned to provide security for visitors and staff. This room is located inside the Jail and is used by attorneys for purposes of interviewing inmate clients. Probation and parole officers and officers of some police agencies also use this area to interview inmates. Surveillance of the interview room should be adequate to detect assaults on visitors, clothing and other contraband exchanges, and escape attempts.

Procedural Security

Several modifications in current security procedures should be implemented to improve Jail and Industrial Farm security.

Presently, key sets are issued to individual employees at the Industrial Farm based on need. The control of access to various areas of the Industrial Farm is necessary to control inmate activity and the use of Farm property. Employees issued key sets should be required to have them securely attached to their belts. This procedure would significantly reduce the possibility of keys being misplaced.

A search team (consisting of two Correctional Officers) currently conducts unscheduled searches of different cell areas of the Jail on a daily basis. The current duties of the search team are important and appear to be conducted in an effective manner. We recommend that reports of contraband discovered during searches be made available to Correctional Officers during watch briefings.

Records indicate a key inventory of the total number of keys in the Jail by key number was performed in October, 1976; November, 1976; and for January, 1977. The inventories did not verify the accuracy of the key log which shows which keys are assigned to each key set. A key inventory should be conducted on a regular basis, at least monthly, to ensure that all keys are accounted for and that assigned keys are on the proper key sets. This recommendation has been implemented.

Procedures should be established to require female Correctional Officers and female visitors to obtain clearance from the person monitoring the corridor between the Inmate Information Office and the Women's Section of the Jail before entering the passageway. On occasion the doors to the misdemeanor dormitories are open and inmates are in the corridor between the Inmate Information Office and the Women's Section. This sometimes occurs when female officers transport female inmates to and from Booking, or when visitors are enroute between the Women's Section and Inmate Information. The presence of females in the corridor, particularly when dormitory doors are open, presents an unnecessary risk to female correctional personnel and female inmates, or visitors who are enroute to or from the Women's Section.

The video tape recording capabilities of the new equipment in Disptach should be utilized to record and store for evidence any disturbance which occurs within view of the facility's closed circuit cameras. When the second floor of the Jail was remodeled, video tape recording equipment was installed in the Dispatch office. There are also numerous television monitors in that office which are tuned to cameras located on each floor. The video tape equipment may be used to record what transpires within view of any of the cameras switched onto those monitors. The Dispatch officer should utilize the video tape equipment to record all disturbances within view of the closed circuit cameras. This material may then be used to assist in prosecuting inmates for crimes committed in Jail.

The procedures for counting inmates should be revised to provide greater inmate accountability to detect escapes or incorrect releases in time to enhance the chances for recapture. Count times should be modified so that a count is conducted at the beginning of each watch and again at an irregular time during each watch, except Watch III where a (roll) count should continue to be conducted at 9:00 p.m. Watch II should conduct a roll count around 12:30 p.m. All inmates actually in the Jail at the time of a count, including trusties, should be counted and uniform procedures should be promulgated in a revised policy and procedure memorandum.

SECTION I - BUREAU ORGANIZATION

1. BUREAU ORGANIZATION

For purposes of specialization of skills, improved delegation and accountability, the Corrections Bureau should be organized along functional lines as well as by watch.

Statement of Condition

The Sheriff's Corrections Bureau is primarily organized along facility lines, with major subdivisions by each of three 8 hour watches per day. This provides for a command and staffing structure around the clock, 365 days per year, to provide for the operation of the facility. It is also oriented toward the post assignment of staff to specific areas of the Jail. However, supervisory officers are only assigned by watch, all sharing responsibility and authority for facility performance with little delineation of individual responsibilities for particular component facility operations. See Exhibit A.

The Chief of bailiff services currently reports to the Jail commander, though there is little direct link between the two activities.

There is little Bureau command organization above the facility (division) level, consisting only of the commander and an administrative sergeant. The commander's responsibilities are also broadly defined. He sometimes feels he must assume direct supervision over aspects of facility operations. The Bureau commander recognizes his responsibility for planning and other essential top management concerns, but is frequently distracted by day to day operational considerations. This situation is accentuated by the physical location of his office within the Jail.

The Jail facility commander is subject to even greater distraction from facility management responsibilities by daily routines, resolving middle management questions and problems, and coordination of the activities of the three watches.

The Bureau commander and Jail commander, in particular, have little resources designated by the organization to which they may delegate authority to handle, and pinpoint responsibility for, the administrative

distractions they receive constantly. The Industrial Farm commander, due to the size of his staff, does not appear to have as great a problem planning and controlling the activities of his organization.

Criteria

Bureau and facility commanders must reserve substantial amounts of their time to engage in the planning needed to cope with present and future demands on the Bureau. This can be effectively accomplished by delegating authority to certain subordinates they designate as responsible for carrying out specific, approved policies and programs. It may also be strengthened by setting aside some personnel resources to assist the Bureau commander in planning and programming activities.

The process of delegation, and establishment of accountability, also reduces a commander's de facto span on supervision to free up time now absorbed in directing personnel below the level of his immediate subordinates. Personnel administration activities are also permitted to be reduced to considerations of the commander's immediate subordinates. The commander is then in a position to devote needed attention to control of organization activities to ensure operations are meeting objectives, and are being carried out in accordance with approved policies and procedures.

Because of the 24 hour per day, seven day a week schedule of the Bureau's activities, the watch oriented organization cannot and should not be abandoned. Supervisory personnel must be on site, and management personnel readily accessible on call at all times, to make certain routine procedures as well as emergencies are handled properly.

Effect

Many Bureau functions have been undergoing significant improvements in the past few years. However, from several findings of this audit and these organizational observations, it appears this progress could be accelerated by a realignment of supervisory and middle management resources.

Key management functions of planning and control, while presently given consideration, should have increased management attention. This same attention needs to be given to the recruitment, retention, and training of career corrections employees. This is quite

difficult for the Bureau and facility commanders under current organizational arrangements because delegation is difficult, and responsibility is divided (shared) at subordinate levels. This makes these two commanders the arbiters, decision makers of unnecessary detail, and conduits of information and coordination among shifts. Little time is left after personnel administration, and day to day operational direction and coordination. Some operational support or service functions receive very little supervision at present.

Cause

There is a need for a functionally, as well as watch, oriented organization structure for the Bureau. Division of accountability among peers (sharing responsibility) must be minimized, if not eliminated. Sufficient authority needs to be delegated to middle management and supervisory personnel for them to perform their specifically and singularly assigned duties.

We feel the supervisory and management resources are available within the Bureau to do the job, but that their realignment will enable management to make considerable improvements in the Bureau.

Recommendations

1. That the Bureau be reorganized into a functional, as well as watch, oriented structure as depicted in Exhibit B. No new Correctional Officer positions are needed to accomplish this reorganization.
2. Office space for the Bureau commander and planning and programming lieutenants should be provided outside the Jail to facilitate their performance of planning and control responsibilities. This should insulate them from day to day operational distractions.
3. That the Personnel Division review the classification specifications of Correctional Lieutenant and Correctional Sergeant to incorporate these added functional responsibilities under the proposed organization.

Department Comment

We agree. Reorganization will be implemented within the time frame suggested.

2. CORRECTIONAL SERGEANT JOB RESPONSIBILITIES

The Department should clarify the responsibilities, and specify the authority, of Correctional Sergeants to increase their usefulness as part of the management team.

Statement of Condition

We asked each Correctional Sergeant to describe his responsibilities and authority, or job activities. These descriptions indicate sergeants:

- a) have a general, relatively consistent concept of their responsibilities;
- b) tend to focus their general responsibilities into few specific assignments;
- c) frequently omit key aspects of a supervisor's role, such as training of subordinates, checking for errors in all operations under their direction, and taking corrective action as appropriate, such as clarifying instructions and providing for training;
- d) have an informal restrictive view of their authority to meet responsibilities. For instance, sergeants tend to evaluate employee performance on an exception basis only. They exercise little authority to evaluate each subordinate in positive terms of what skills need strengthening, whether and how performance may otherwise be improved, and take steps to implement such action.

Our practical observation of sergeant activities also indicates an underutilization of their knowledge and services for management. Many of these experienced officers rely on subordinate Correctional Officers and clerks to advise them of errors, indicating their responsibilities for controlling employee performance through detection and correction of errors could be more completely spelled-out. Responsibility for the analysis of problems and development of solutions is seldom delegated to a specific individual, except the administrative sergeant, and is occasionally given to a group of sergeants for "brainstorming" without specifying who is actually responsible. The scope of these problem solving efforts is also frequently limited to temporary solutions to operational problems,

instead of developing and installing a carefully designed, permanent remedy to a situation. If a permanent remedy should be developed, supervisorial enforcement of that new policy or procedure is not always consistently maintained on a 24 hour basis. Supervisorial attention to monitoring and maintaining the new policy or procedure frequently subsides within a few months and the new approach is abandoned.

Many sergeants are also apparently unable or unwilling to assume a working supervisor role to help out during peak workload periods, or to obtain a better understanding of the functions which they supervise.

We have also noted a reluctance of sergeants to inspect inmate areas of the Women's Section of the Jail. Their supervision is limited to the security station area, and indirect communications with inmates.

The proximity of the watch commander to sergeants, in using the same office, gives staff an access to a higher command level which can permit them to circumvent their immediate supervisors and undermine sergeant responsibility and authority. Also, higher command levels are occasionally reversing sergeant decisions without explaining their reasons.

Criteria

Correctional Sergeants, as first line supervisors, should be held accountable for conditions or errors committed on their shift by staff under their direction. They should be expected to develop recommendations for the solution of problems or improvement of operations with or without the explicit direction of higher command to initiate these efforts. They should be expected to develop and regularly submit management reports which reflect the activities of their shift, identify operational problems, assess the needs of the shift, and identify and measure their own efforts as supervisors.

The authority needed to carry out these responsibilities should be identified by management and explicitly delegated in writing to sergeants.

Effect

- Feedback to management on problems with jail operations often comes from outside agencies with which the Jail must operate. Internal problems may go undetected, unreported, or unappreciated.
- Problems are not resolved as expeditiously or as effectively as possible.
- Morale in the ranks is adversely affected where line employees perceive their responsibility for day to day jail operations as greater than their supervisors.
- Sergeants do not often take an aggressive role in helping their subordinates perform their jobs more effectively or accurately.
- Line staff often are the only ones held accountable for errors they commit which are detected. Morale is adversely affected when supervisors do not share in this responsibility as they should.

Cause

- Usually more than one sergeant is assigned to a watch. The division of responsibilities among them is not always clear, and in fact changes during a shift. Divided responsibility eliminates accountability.
- Management tends to hold first line employees directly accountable for errors. Instead, captains should hold lieutenants responsible, lieutenants hold sergeants responsible, and sergeants hold staff responsible.
- Management has not fully utilized the capacity of first line supervisors to provide assistance for the analysis and solution of problems. Such assignments must be delegated to not only develop first line supervisors, but to relieve the facility commander of time-consuming fact gathering activity. Currently, these assignments are disproportionately given by the Bureau commander to an administrative sergeant who is missing an opportunity to gain supervisory experience.
- Management has not adequately specified what sergeant responsibilities include. This specification process must be thoroughly developed. Responsibility for unrecurrent projects must also be explicitly assigned to an individual.

- Correctional Sergeant authority has not been adequately specified to promote the full potential use and initiative of these first line supervisors.
- Correctional Sergeants have not received supervisory training. Many are new in their positions and may not have yet developed the confidence and initiative to perform as complete supervisors. Management support and direction is needed to hasten this process.
- Assignment of sergeants to Watch II (day shift), where they are most available for administrative assignments from management, is based partially on seniority rather than on the possession of skills which equip them to provide staff support to the Bureau and facility commanders.
- The watch commanders and watch sergeants share the same office. Similarly, the Bureau commander has an office in the Jail situated where he can readily intervene in routine administrative matters of the Jail Division.

Recommendations

4. Management should undertake to clarify sergeant responsibilities by individual. This should be reduced to writing for both ongoing responsibilities and short term ones. Sergeant authority should also be spelled out, and checked to see that authority is sufficient to carry out their responsibilities and be held accountable.
5. Management should hold the immediately lower command level primarily responsible for errors by anyone under that command level.
6. Assignment of sergeants to Watch II should be based upon their skills and the needs of management, without regard to seniority.
7. Lieutenants should be located in an office other than the one used by the watch sergeants.

Department Comment

We agree. The recommendations stated in this study should be accomplished via the Bureau reorganization. Lieutenants will occupy different offices upon the reorganization.

3. SUPERVISORY CLERICAL POSITIONS

There should be supervisory clerical positions established to be responsible for the functions of the Jail Records Clerks.

Statement of Condition

Currently, Jail Records Clerks are utilized in Booking, the Inmate Information Office, and in Accounting. At Booking, one Jail Records Clerk handles all cash register transactions and the other handles clerical booking functions. In Inmate Information, one clerk works the front desk answering the telephone and assisting the public at the window. The second clerk works at the back desk and is responsible for inmate court and other paper work. These four posts are handled on a rotating basis by Jail Records Clerks.

The non-rotating position handled by a Jail Records Clerk is in the Accounting Office. This clerk assists the Account Clerk and is responsible for handling incoming and outgoing inmate mail and transporting money from Booking and the Inmate Information Office to the appropriate locations.

Under the existing situation, Jail Records Clerks are trained on-the-job by available personnel. There is no specific Jail Records Clerk training program or periodic additional training provided. Consequently, when a Jail Records Clerk needs assistance to perform a function, he asks the most experienced available clerk.

Under the current organization structure the supervisor for all Jail Records Clerks is any on duty watch sergeant. Some of the Correctional Officer personnel began their careers in the Sheriff's Department as Jail Records Clerks and they are capable of providing effective assistance. However, other officers have not had any previous experience in this area and are not familiar with the operations of the Inmate Information Office. Under the latter type of watch sergeant, a clerk must either exercise his own judgment, follow the directions of inexperienced supervisory personnel, or find a knowledgeable clerk for advice.

Criteria

Jail Records Clerks should be supervised by a clerical supervisor. That individual should work closely with other Bureau supervisors to ensure uniform use of current jail procedures. The supervisor should schedule all Jail Records Clerks, be responsible for their performance, and prepare proficiency evaluations on a regular basis. Other duties should include assisting in recruitment and establishing and executing a training program for this classification.

Effect

Responsibility and accountability for the performance of Jail Records Clerks is dispersed, employee morale and effectiveness is reduced, and continuity between watches is significantly hampered. Effective training and employee performance is also made much more difficult.

Cause

Most of the current supervisors for clerical jail personnel are unfamiliar with many of the tasks performed by the Jail Records Clerks, and have numerous other responsibilities that divert their attention from managing clerical activities.

Recommendations

8. Jail Records Clerks and the Account Clerk should have two supervisors, one subordinate to the other.
9. The lead supervisor should work Watch II and the other Watch III (evening shift). They should work 8½ hour shifts (with ½ hour lunch breaks) to provide that they overlap regular shifts and can coordinate and communicate with personnel on all three watches.
10. The supervisor and his subordinate supervisor should be familiar with jail operations and all tasks performed by Jail Records Clerks and the Account Clerk.

Department Comment

We agree. Two Supervising Jail Records Clerk positions have been requested for the fiscal year 1977-78 budget.

4. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

There is a need for accurate and current statistics on Jail activities and workload. The Industrial Farm has a statistical reporting system, but it needs to be reevaluated for the usefulness of the information generated.

Statement of Condition

Presently, only minimal statistics on jail activity and workload are collected. These include jail population, bookings and releases, and the number and cost of meals served. Even this minimal data, collected on a continuous basis, is not regularly summarized

(i.e., weekly, monthly, year-to-date) except for the data on cost and number of meals served.

The Industrial Farm collects data on its inmate population and summarizes it on a daily and monthly basis. These data cover such areas as offense, age and race, and number of inmates.

Criteria

The Corrections Bureau should develop an explicit, written policy setting forth its management information objectives and requirements. These objectives might be to measure activity on a one-time or ongoing basis in order to assess productivity, detect variations from norms, shift resources to meet workload changes or trends, plan manpower or other resource requirements, to recognize problems in interdepartmental coordination, determine the effects of policy or procedure changes, or other purposes.

The definition of specific information requirements to meet chosen objectives should evolve carefully to be certain to collect only information most useful to management in monitoring and assessing Bureau activities. Not only the type of data collected, but its form and frequency, should be planned to achieve specific purposes.

A useful management information system will usually consist of several types of data. Workload or units of activity statistics are elementary building blocks of an information system. Relevant workload statistics for the Jail might include citations, court appearances, visits, bookings, releases, inmate population, escorts to Valley Medical Center, infirmary sick call visits, and/or others. To this data may be added such factors as backlog time, time to complete processes, man-hours expended for certain functions, or manpower deployment. The selection of these or other data for collection and summary must be based upon the output information being sought. That in turn is based upon what management is trying to learn or monitor (the information objective).

Management information objectives will also determine the manner in which data should be summarized. These choices would include data by watch, day of the week, weekly totals, monthly, quarterly, annually, and year-to-date. Comparisons may be made by chosen time periods such as the same quarter last year, same year-to-date last year, etc., to detect trends.

Exception reporting is another form of management information which consists of counting the frequency of activities which fall outside acceptable parameters or norms of time or accuracy. This type of information presents different collection problems, but is easily summarized.

Effect

Many possible types of information useful to the efficient and effective management of the detention facilities are not being collected and used by supervisory and management personnel. The Bureau is depriving itself of a valuable tool to evaluate, compare, and thereby plan and control the activities and cost of the detention facilities. Management information systems are part of a variety of feedback sources needed to help management determine how, when, where and why to redirect the course of operations.

Justification for personnel, supplies and equipment cannot presently be based upon documented workload variations.

The performance of personnel is not monitored as effectively as possible. This allows trends or variations in performance to go undetected, resulting in decreased facility effectiveness.

Cause

The Corrections Bureau has not comprehensively assessed its management information needs, nor developed and implemented a statistical collection system.

Recommendations

11. The Sheriff should develop and implement an explicit, written policy outlining the management information objectives and requirements of the Corrections Bureau. It is incumbent upon management to take a lead role in developing management information specifications. Only the design and functions of collection and summarization can be effectively delegated.
12. Most management information should be collected and summarized by each watch to minimize the amount of central summarizing activity to prepare facility totals.

Department Comment

We agree. Prior to and during the Corrections Bureau reorganization, an in-depth evaluation will be made to determine

the management needs of the facility. As those needs are identified, policy and procedures will be developed to implement the collection and utilization of statistical data. The compilation of the latter will initially be through a manual process. Subsequently, it is expected to be programmed into any automated system that is developed for the facility.

EXHIBIT A

CURRENT CORRECTIONS BUREAU ORGANIZATION





EXHIBIT B

CORRECTIONS BUREAU ORGANIZATION (PROPOSED)



SECTION II - EMPLOYEE JOB DUTIES AND POLICIES

5. CORRECTIONS BUREAU POLICY AND PROCEDURE MEMORANDA

Bureau policy and procedure memoranda should be issued on recognizable department forms, be consistently formatted, dated, indexed, periodically updated, and be more readily accessible to all Jail and Industrial Farm personnel.

Statement of Condition

The Corrections Bureau began reissuing policy and procedure memoranda to its employees in January, 1976.

To date there have been 23 memoranda issued.

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date of Issue</u>	<u>Signed</u>	<u>Heading</u>
Guard Instructions - VMC	Undated	Unsigned	Irregular
Visitation, Money, Property	Undated	Unsigned	Regular
Security Counts	Undated	Unsigned	Irregular
Processing newspapers, magazines, periodicals and books	Undated	Unsigned	Irregular
Key Control	1-16-77	Sheriff	Regular
Use of Whistle Alarm	Undated	Sheriff	Regular
Processing Women Weekenders	2-4-76	Sheriff	Regular
No Hostage Policy	Undated	Sheriff	Regular
In-Custody Marriages	3-1-76	Unsigned	Irregular
Search Team	2-11-76	Unsigned	Irregular
Jail Evacuation Plan	3-23-76	Unsigned	Regular
VMC Psych Ward Guard Instructions	3-31-76	Sheriff	Regular
Disciplinary Procedure for the Jail	Undated	Sheriff	Regular
Classification	Undated	Unsigned	Regular
Floor Officer Duties & Responsibilities	6-2-76	Unsigned	Regular
Processing of Incoming Inmate Mail	Undated	Unsigned	Irregular
Visiting Procedure	Undated	Sheriff	Regular
Response to Intrusion Alarm	8-5-76	Unsigned	Regular
Industrial Farm Booking Procedures	10-28-76	*B. Cmdr.	Irregular
Juvenile Inmates (Male)	Undated	*B. Cmdr.	Irregular

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date of Issue</u>	<u>Signed</u>	<u>Heading</u>
Maximum Security High Power Inmates	11-3-76	*B. Cmdr.	Irregular
Exercise & Outside Recreation Activities	Undated	Unsigned	Irregular
Inmate Information Office Procedure	<u>Undated</u>	<u>Unsigned</u>	<u>Irregular</u>
TOTAL 23	10 Dated	10 Signed	12 Regular

*Bureau Commander

Policy and procedure memoranda are on file in the Bureau and facility commanders' offices, the watch commander's office, and the administrative sergeant's office. They are normally introduced and discussed at watch briefings when issued, then posted on the bulletin board, and eventually filed in the watch commander's office. All memoranda have recently been reviewed again at briefings.

The format of these memoranda is logical, though they are inconsistent in their appearance. The purpose of preparing the memorandum (why) is rarely explicitly stated. The topic description is not always clear or succinct.

There is no indication on the memoranda indicating whether the current version supersedes another of a certain date. In comparing some memoranda to current practices, inconsistencies can be found that may indicate there is no conscious effort to regularly update these memoranda to indicate currently accepted or preferred practice.

There is no published list of currently in force policy and procedure memoranda of the Corrections Bureau.

The number of subjects covered by existing memoranda is not yet comprehensive, but this is probably due to the relatively recent effort to reissue them. We find they sometimes attempt to describe entire post or line job responsibilities, but more frequently are targeted toward specific situations or activities. The former are usually lengthy and more complicated.

Criteria

Preparation and distribution of policy and procedure memoranda are fundamental tools management uses to establish accountability and control over operations. It also provides for uniformity of procedure

and coordination between shifts when enforced. The Corrections Bureau should endeavor to provide a comprehensive series of such documents, and distribute them widely to personnel.

Memoranda should clearly indicate their status as policy and procedure directives by a standardized heading. They should also indicate effective date, the title and date of any memorandum they supersede, issuing authority (Department Head, Unit Commander), topic, and why they are being issued (management's motive for issuing). Format and organization should be carefully planned and consistent.

Memoranda should be readily and conveniently available to all personnel for reference and study. They should be a working tool of line personnel, and as such be kept up to date.

Job descriptions (by post assignment) should be the subject of reports or manuals separate and apart from policy and procedure memoranda. Memoranda should be directed toward specific activities or functions. This should maximize their effectiveness as versatile, explicit instructions. Job descriptions (task lists) are too lengthy, and dilute the usefulness of policy and procedure memoranda.

Effect

Policy and procedure memoranda, as presently administered, are not effective management tools for promoting accountability and uniformity.

Cause

- Memoranda should be more carefully written and issued.
- The use and design of the policy and procedure system needs more adequate planning by management.
- Memoranda should be more accessible to employees to ensure their use.

Recommendations

13. All policy and procedure memoranda should be properly titled, headed, written, dated, and signed by the issuing authority.
14. All such memoranda should have meaningful purpose statements, carry the date and title of any memorandum

they supersede, and consistently follow a planned format.

15. Copies of all memoranda should be distributed to affected, or possibly affected, personnel in a form suitable for retention in a loose leaf notebook. They should also be placed in secure work stations throughout the Jail for reference purposes. Each issue of a new or updated memorandum should be accompanied by a new list of issued memoranda showing title, reference number, and date of issue of all memoranda currently in force.
16. Job descriptions should be provided by some vehicle other than policy and procedure memoranda.
17. All existing memoranda in force should be reviewed and updated to make them consistent with these recommendations.
18. A list of topics for potentially new memoranda should be developed, and their preparation planned and executed to meet specific operational needs and management concerns.

Department Comment

We agree. These responsibilities fall within the duties of one of the new sections created by the reorganization. With the addition of this section, the consolidation, updating, and additions when necessary, can be made to the memoranda.

6. EMPLOYEE MANUAL

The Corrections Bureau should compile a comprehensive employee manual and make it available to all employees.

Statement of Condition

The policy manual for the Sheriff's Department has just been revised and updated. This policy manual concerns department policies that are applicable to the department as a whole.

Duties of employees assigned to particular posts in the Jail are being compiled and specific job descriptions are being written for each assignment. Some written descriptions of post assignments, such as for the Inmate Information clerk, and the guards at Valley Medical Center, have been developed.

Policy and procedures memoranda for the Corrections Bureau are available to employees in the watch commander's office. Some work stations have copies of some of the memos.

Copies of minimum jail standards and applicable California laws are given under separate cover to corrections employees. These are obtained at no charge from the State Department of Corrections.

Criteria

The department policy manual is a valuable document for setting forth policy that is applicable to the entire department and should be available to all employees.

Minimum jail standards, certain California laws, and policy and procedures memoranda developed by the Corrections Bureau are peculiar to the corrections function. This information should also be readily available to Corrections Bureau employees and updated on a regular basis.

Job descriptions for each position should also be available to each assigned employee. These descriptions, when properly maintained, are useful for training new employees, informing employees of new or revised procedures and duties, and promoting continuity between shifts.

Effect

Employee ignorance or misunderstanding of current policies and job duties causes confusion among employees and between watches.

Cause

The department policy manual is being revised and is about to be distributed.

The post job descriptions have not yet been completely developed. Bureau policy and procedures memoranda have only been developed over the last year, and only limited distribution was perceived as necessary.

Recommendations

19. An employee manual for the Corrections Bureau should be developed consisting of the department policy manual, Corrections Bureau policy and procedures memoranda, job descriptions, minimum jail standards and applicable California laws. This comprehensive manual should be made available to employees at designated work locations, such as Booking and floor security stations. A copy

should also be issued to each employee and turned in by the employee upon termination of employment.

20. The employee manual should be regularly updated and a record kept of individuals receiving revisions to ensure the continued usefulness of each copy of the document.

Department Comment

We agree. Under the reorganization, additional personnel will become available to consolidate the present incomplete manual and make additions to that document to make it complete. Additionally, shortly each employee will be issued a copy of the departmental manual that has just been completed.

SECTION III - TRAINING OF EMPLOYEES

7. BASIC CORRECTIONAL ACADEMY CONTENT

The Sheriff should continue to provide input to the community college on the most useful course content and training techniques for the Basic Correctional Academy on jail operations.

Statement of Condition

The most recent 40-hour basic academy for Correctional Officers was held the week of December 13-17, 1976. Sheriff's personnel provided recommendations for the curriculum that provided course topics of immediate benefit to new Correctional Officers responsible for the supervision of prisoners.

An effective class at the latest academy was on search methods, and utilized a field exercise to provide a more realistic training experience.

Most classes included little written material for study by the officers, relying heavily on lecture to convey this information. Available manuals on minimum jail standards, and laws and guidelines for operation of local detention facilities, were not available to most students and were not systematically incorporated into the course content.

A criticism of the academy by some students is that the course reiterates much of what has already been learned on the job since initial employment. This amounts to a duplication of training effort since the academy often does not go into more elaborate detail.

Criteria

Basic academy training should be rigorous to encourage better student familiarity with subjects which are vital to safe and effective job performance in a custody setting. This requires thorough reading assignments and materials, and field exercises, as well as informative lectures.

A well rounded academy should also introduce the Correctional Officer to basic safety subjects including evacuation, firearms familiarization and qualification, self-defense tactics, riot suppression techniques including gas and baton training, and CPR-first aid.

Course curriculum should be based partially upon an analysis of errors in actual operations which can be attributed to training deficiencies, and be coordinated with inservice training programs.

Course content should be designed to augment initial on-the-job-training, or be structured to provide initial training if it, in fact, is given at the time of initial employment.

Effect

The potential exists for errors to be committed in custody procedures due to training deficiencies which can adversely affect Jail and Industrial Farm operations.

Cause

Until recently, course content at the basic academy was left to the community college with little or no input from the Sheriff's Department. This promoted an academic, rather than practical, approach to academy training classes. This situation is changing and needs further encouragement and management attention.

Recommendations

21. That the Sheriff continue to encourage the community college to modify basic academy curriculum to amplify subjects important to the safety and effective performance of officers. Courses should increasingly utilize field exercises and training aides.
22. That the Sheriff evaluate new Correctional Officer performance to establish what training topics are most needed in the basic academy.

Department Comment

We agree. The department is constantly coordinating with the training agencies to ensure that academy material is pertinent to the job requirements.

8. CORRECTIONAL OFFICER TRAINING UPON INITIAL EMPLOYMENT

New Correctional Officers should be sent to the Basic Correctional Academy immediately after initial employment or as soon thereafter as possible.

Statement of Condition

Of 23 officers attending the December 13-17, 1976 academy, 16 were employed as permanent full-time Correctional Officers for six or more weeks before attending class. Collectively, these 16 officers worked a total of 129 weeks prior to attending the academy. All 23 officers collectively worked 150 weeks before receiving this training.

The Corrections Bureau relies heavily on initial training of new officers by experienced officers while on the job. This buddy system approach lasts for approximately a month before a new Correctional Officer is permitted to work with some independence. Further training occurs at regular watch briefings, and by individual counseling from watch commanders and sergeants as errors are made and reported.

Criteria

Leadman training is an important orientation and training technique, but it cannot be expected to be systematic or complete. It should, therefore, not be the only means used to initially prepare a new Correctional Officer for assignment in a security situation. Some classroom and well-designed practical exercise training is also necessary to equip an individual to control potentially dangerous inmates and accurately perform more complex duties.

An inservice training program is an excellent means of providing refresher training, or briefing personnel on new developments. But by definition, it must follow initial employment and assignment where an officer's degree of training and preparation affects the safety of himself and his fellow officers.

Effect

New Correctional Officers are being hired and assigned to the Jail and Industrial Farm with little preparation for all the various types of situations in which they could find themselves.

The lag in formal training extends the period during which new officers are of limited use to the Corrections Bureau. Flexibility in the assignment of personnel is affected.

Cause

Pressures to fill vacancies to operate the Jail and Industrial Farm encourage placement of new Correctional Officers before they can be given complete initial training.

The rate of recruitment of Correctional Officers by Fresno and neighboring Counties does not permit accumulation of sufficient students for a local academy class more than two to three times annually.

Many Correctional Officers are hired who have experience serving as reserve deputies in the Jail or Industrial Farm. Though they have not received formal corrections training at the academy as reserves, their extensive working experience is used to justify a delay in receiving immediate formal training upon full-time employment.

Recommendations

23. That the Sheriff examine the cost and feasibility of scheduling more frequent basic academy classes for new officers. Another alternative to consider would be utilizing equivalent academy training conducted elsewhere such as the Department of Corrections class in Modesto.
24. That the assignment of new Correctional Officers be strictly limited to relatively safe posts until basic academy training has been completed.
25. That extra-help Correctional Officers and reservists used regularly at the Jail and Industrial Farm be given formal correctional academy training as well.

Department Comment

We agree. The possibility of sending new officers to an academy, other than the one presented in Fresno, is being researched. This situation would arise when Fresno did not have enough students for the community college to justify a class.

9. TRAINING CORRECTIONAL SERGEANTS AND LIEUTENANTS

Correctional Sergeants should be given supervisory training as are Deputy Sergeants. Also, Correctional Lieutenants should be sent to management training as are Deputy Lieutenants, and to supervisory training as well.

Statement of Condition

We asked Correctional Sergeants and Lieutenants to describe their job responsibilities. These reports indicate these officers have varying concepts of their responsibilities to supervise and control jail personnel. Our observations of Correctional Sergeants and Lieutenants indicate many tend to react to problems rather than be aggressive in identifying and solving potential problems.

We have observed some sergeants and lieutenants occasionally dealing with subordinates in a manner which undermines their own respect and authority. This manner is best described as being too familiar, or giving flippant answers to legitimate questions.

Correctional Sergeants and Lieutenants are relatively new classifications, and incumbents have so far not been included in supervisory and management training routinely given to Deputy Sergeants and Lieutenants.

Criteria

Correctional Sergeants and Lieutenants should have training in supervisory techniques and management responsibilities. Useful supervisory training should include such topics as: problems in supervision, duties and responsibilities of supervisors, communications principles, the supervisor's relationship to management, motivating employees, techniques of inspections, handling and preventing complaints, techniques of training subordinates, decision making, leadership, psychological aspects of supervision, laws affecting supervisors performance appraisal and rating procedures, use and interpretation of policies and procedures, special personnel problems, making duty assignments, job analysis, and morale and discipline.

Supervisors should be impartial, fair, consistent, courteous, and firm with subordinates, inmates and the public. Supervisors must be thoroughly familiar with the responsibilities of their subordinates.

Effect

Morale among many Correctional Officers and other jail personnel is lowered in large part due to a distrust of supervisors. Problems are not addressed and solved as rapidly as could be expected and without involving higher command levels.

Training of subordinates is delegated to their peers without close involvement of supervisors. Supervisors sometimes lack the initiative and resourcefulness to pinpoint and alleviate bottlenecks, and help staff through peak periods. Supervisors do not communicate their instructions well to staff.

Cause

Correctional Sergeants and Lieutenants have not been sent to available training courses to accelerate their growth as supervisors.

Recommendation

26. Send Correctional Sergeants and Lieutenants to supervisory training courses, and lieutenants to management courses, to sharpen their skills in these areas.

Department Comment

The Department agrees in principle with the recommendation. Management also suggests that they must be selective in the selection of the school, course content and instructor to ensure that these officers receive an effective training experience.

CAO Response

We would agree that the Department must be selective in choosing the training courses to which it sends its supervisory and management personnel. This concern also illustrates the importance of establishing a program lieutenant with the responsibility to ensure Bureau personnel receive appropriate and effective training (see finding on Bureau Organization).

SECTION IV - CORRECTIONAL OFFICER TURNOVER RATE AND MORALE

10. CORRECTIONAL OFFICER TURNOVER RATE

The current turnover rate of Correctional Officers indicates a need to improve the County's ability to attract and retain qualified personnel for these positions.

Statement of Condition

The turnover rate for the period of January, 1976 through December, 1976 was 19% for Correctional Officers at the Jail and Industrial Farm. During this time, 11 Correctional Officers resigned at the Jail and 2 resigned at the Farm, 1 retired at the Farm, and 2 were dismissed at the Jail.

Criteria

Correctional Officer turnover rate should be maintained at a more acceptable level of 5% to 10% (the overall County rate is 16%). Many departments within the County maintain a rate under 10%.

A staff of experienced and well trained Correctional Officers should be retained as the primary Corrections Bureau work force to ensure the effective and efficient operation of the Jail and Industrial Farm.

Effect

The current turnover rate for Correctional Officers consumes an inordinate amount of time and expense hiring and training new employees. It also results in inexperienced personnel being assigned to fill essential positions. The assignment of inexperienced personnel also places greater responsibility on senior Correctional Officers making their duties that much more difficult. This contributes significantly to a lowering of the efficiency, effectiveness, and morale of the Jail and Industrial Farm.

Cause

More aggressive recruitment and training and supportive supervision of employees is needed to encourage retention of Correctional

Officers and lower the excessive turnover rate.

Recommendations

27. Recruitment of Correctional Officers should be oriented toward individuals who want to pursue corrections as a career.
28. Correctional Officers should be interviewed upon resigning to determine if modifications in recruitment effort or personnel procedures are needed.
29. Correctional Officers should be evaluated at least annually to note performance deficiencies and develop remedial plans, or to commend exceptional performance.

Implementation of recommendations in the findings on sergeant duties and training will also improve the retention of qualified Correctional Officers.

Department Comment

We agree. A new evaluation system is being developed. Recruiting and retention will be defined as one of the responsibilities of the programs lieutenant under the new reorganization. This will help to ensure that a more correctionally oriented employee is hired, and develop a retention program to reduce the turnover rate.

11. BUREAU MORALE AND EFFECTIVENESS

There is a feeling, shared by many Sheriff Deputies and Correctional Officers, that the importance of the Correctional Officer job is secondary or subordinate to that of the deputies. Management should consciously continue to work to correct this misconception of the status of the Corrections Bureau in the Department in order to maximize the morale and effectiveness of the Bureau.

Statement of Condition

We have seen indications of a lingering attitude from previous jail administrations that the responsibilities of Correctional Officers are inferior in importance to that of deputies. The original reasons for this attitude may be attributed to practices in prior years:

- Assignment of deputies to the Jail for disciplinary reasons or training purposes.

- Assignment of more responsible jobs and supervisory positions to deputies, and the less responsible to Correctional Officers, as the new class was phased into the Bureau.

These conditions have been virtually eliminated with the complete phase in of Correctional Officers at the line and supervisory levels in the Bureau. The only deputy officers left are the Bureau, Jail, and Farm commanders, and the bailiffs.

Many officers still feel the Deputy Sheriff job is superior because of compensation, the challenges of the street environment, promotional opportunities, and public esteem for the law enforcement officer.

Many individuals have sought positions in the Corrections Bureau as preparation for a career in law enforcement, through association and training with the Sheriff's Department. This is apparent from the letters of resignation of Correctional Officers.

Some current working conditions contribute to or sustain the low morale of the Bureau. As indicated by other findings in this report, this includes problems of training, turnover, supervision, policy and procedure guidelines, feedback, performance evaluations, and numerous unresolved, minor irritations as well.

Criteria

Corrections is not a subordinate function to law enforcement. They are separate and different functions, and one should not be regarded as a stepping stone to the other.

Corrections and law enforcement are both active, cohesive parts of the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, they have different goals and missions. While both are organizationally placed within the Sheriff's Department, they are separate elements of a larger criminal justice system. It is no more appropriate to rate one against the other in importance to the overall system, than it is to rate the Sheriff's Department against the District Attorney, Public Defender, the Courts, etc.

Both corrections and law enforcement share the motive of seeking to contribute to a society of laws, one emphasizing protection of the public and apprehension of offenders, while the other emphasizes safe and healthful custody of persons accused or convicted of committing a crime, and in encouraging the offender to adopt a lawful

life style. These are very complex issues, but they are not legitimate grounds for ranking one function against the other.

Compensation boils down to an issue of supply and demand in the job market for individuals with certain qualifications to perform specific and unique duties. This is also an inappropriate reason to compare and rate the two functions.

Promotional opportunities have been improved considerably in recent months. Four Correctional Lieutenant positions were filled this fiscal year as ranking Deputy Sheriff positions were phased out of the Jail. This development allowed additional Correctional Officers to advance to Correctional Sergeant, which is also a relatively new class. Promotional opportunities in the Bureau have therefore been very good in recent years and the comparison to law enforcement has been favorable.

There are significant challenges to working in a correctional environment, though they are different than those of law enforcement. Correctional Officers must be able to supervise and control a predominantly hostile, unpredictable and unreliable clientele. They must do so in a manner which protects the safety of themselves, other staff and the inmates. They must be conwise, understand the psychology of incarceration to avert tensions, and be adept at reading danger signals. A detention facility, though a closed environment, has its risks and hazards. Successfully meeting these challenges on a daily basis can be rewarding to the career Correctional Officer.

Public esteem for law enforcement personnel may motivate some people to pursue that career. Most persons who enjoy their work, however, do not have or need that support to find job satisfaction. Perhaps the proximity of correctional personnel to law enforcement personnel generates some envy in the former, but corrections personnel should more logically compare their lot to the vast number of other career fields which are more or less attractive to a given individual. The individual who pursues law enforcement as a career because of public esteem may find himself chasing an illusory form of gratification to find job satisfaction. His disillusionment may be greater than the envy felt by the Correctional Officer who is aspiring to enter the law enforcement field. It seems to us that public esteem as a criteria for ranking one career field against another is too subjective and variable to be valid.

The selection process for Correctional Officers should strive to recruit persons interested in corrections as a career. Stability and effectiveness of the Corrections Bureau cannot be sustained by employees with short range objectives of familiarizing themselves with criminal behavior and criminal law to prepare them to eventually move into law enforcement.

Morale and work performance of the Bureau should be positively stimulated by better training, improved specification of job responsibilities, good supervision, and other enhancements recommended in this report.

Effect

Morale is adversely affected by the department's negative esteem for corrections, both inside and outside the Bureau. Low morale can detract from efforts to perform work well.

Excessive turnover is promoted by this situation, causing instability in the Bureau. This places training and scheduling strains on the organization, which can only adversely affect efficiency and effectiveness.

Employees with only short range interests in corrections may be poorly motivated to contribute to the continuing improvement in operations of the Bureau.

Problems in training, supervision, and specification of policies and procedures adversely affect the morale and performance of the detention facilities.

Cause

Historically, the corrections function was probably given inferior status, or at least a lower level of management attention, from the top management of the Sheriff's Department. The current administration has improved the situation considerably by showing interest in the Bureau, and by placing emphasis on solving the problems of the Bureau.

Recommendations

30. The Sheriff should continue to stress that the Corrections Bureau is an important, integral part of his Department. He should impress upon all personnel of the Department,

including those of the Bureau, the significance each contributes to the varied missions of the Office of the Sheriff. His aggressive stance on this point, coupled with continuing attention to the resolution of the Bureau's problems, can accelerate the rise in the motivation level of Corrections Bureau employees.

31. Recruitment and training of Correctional Officers should seek to attract and retain a career oriented nucleus of personnel in the Bureau.

Department Comment

The Department feels that most morale difficulties will be alleviated with the implementation of many of the recommendations in this report. Changes in organization, supervision, better specification of responsibility and authority, security modifications, and training should go far in improving job motivation and satisfaction.

SECTION V - INMATE HEALTH AND WELFARE

12. ACCEPTANCE OF INMATE MEDICATION

A policy and procedure for processing inmate medication received from the public at the Inmate Information Office and "M" Street visitor's entrance should be written and distributed to all employees. It should minimize the opportunity for an inmate to receive medication without the knowledge of the infirmary physician, and prevent diversion.

Statement of Condition

Regular and relief personnel do not have a written policy or guidelines for accepting and handling inmate medication received at the Inmate Information Office or at the "M" Street entrance.

Currently, jail personnel are instructed by senior personnel to accept the medication and send it to the jail infirmary.

Criteria

Each employee required to accept inmate medication should have a copy of a written policy and procedure to correctly handle receipt of inmate medication.

Effect

Exclusive use of verbal instructions to train personnel to correctly process inmate medication may result in an inmate receiving unauthorized medication. The employee may not receive or remember verbal instructions, and could improperly route the medication. A more likely prospect is he may be unable to answer public questions concerning the processing of inmate medication received at the Inmate Information Office or at the "M" Street entrance.

Cause

The facility administrator has not prepared a memorandum to jail personnel instructing them in the proper procedures to be followed in accepting and transmitting medication to the jail infirmary.

Recommendation

32. A written policy and procedure should be prepared setting forth the acceptable procedure for processing inmate medication received at the Inmate Information Office or at the "M" Street entrance.

Department Comment

We agree. A written policy and procedure will be developed to ensure that only infirmary staff accept restricted medications from the public for persons in custody.

13. MEDICATION DISPENSING SYSTEM AT THE JAIL

The present system for dispensing prescription medication to jail prisoners should be improved to further ensure proper doses are taken at prescribed intervals, the correct individuals receive medication, and handling and packaging of drugs is minimized to conserve medical staff resources.

Statement of Condition

The medication dispensing system is presently geared to limit the quantity of drugs given to an inmate to that which he should ingest at that time. This is called unit dose control.

Medication is currently dispensed three times each day, at approximately 7:00 a.m., 5:00 p.m., 10:00 p.m., seven days a week. Each dispensing round is called a "med" or "pass". Infirmiry nurses make rounds to the tanks Monday through Friday for this purpose, and Correctional Officers dispense "prepared" meds on weekends or when nurses are unavailable, as prescribed by the infirmiry doctor.

Instructions for prescription medication, as well as a record of drugs dispensed, are kept on 2 X 3 inch envelopes for each patient. A separate envelope is prepared by the RN for each prescription. Pills and capsules for each day's three passes are inserted by hand into each envelope by the infirmiry nursing staff. A three day supply is prepared on Friday for the weekend passes. Liquid medications are also dispensed from records on these envelopes, though a separate plastic cup is used to package these doses. The cup is color coded as to contents, but is not identified as belonging

to a specific inmate unless it is a "controlled" drug or an infrequently prescribed medication.

A medication cart is used to transport filled prescription envelopes, cups of liquid medication, and non-prescription drugs, to the various tanks within the Jail for each pass. The nurse (or Correctional Officer) reads the envelopes for pass instructions, which are sorted by tank, and passes the prescribed medication to the inmate in the tank who responds to a name call. Identification is occasionally requested if the inmate isn't recognized, and consists of a copy of the inmate's booking slip which contains a physical description. Sometimes the medication envelope is checked off by the nurse to indicate the pass was given, particularly when an inmate is located in another tank from that indicated on the envelope.

For weekends, infirmiry staff prepare six additional envelopes on Friday for each prescription and group them by pass time and tank location of the inmate. Liquids are also prepared, grouped with the envelopes, and marked with the identity of the inmate. This is a very time consuming process.

Inmates are not given instructions at the time of the pass on when to take the medication for best results, although liquids are supposed to be taken immediately in the presence of the nurse. This is the principal reason for dispensing those drugs in liquid rather than pill or capsule form. Normally, when a prescription is ordered at sick call, the inmate is given verbal instructions on how frequently to take the pill or capsule medication.

As of February 1, 1977, 327 prescriptions were being processed daily by the infirmiry.

A Correctional Sergeant has been assigned to study the medication dispensing system and develop recommendations for improving its efficiency.

Criteria

A medication dispensing system in a custody setting needs to guard against stockpiling of dangerous drugs that could be harmful if overdosed. It must also ensure that the correct individuals receive their medication, and that the medication is taken in the proper quantities and intervals for maximum benefit to the health of the inmate.

A more routine consideration, but also important, is to maintain a legal and useful record of drugs dispensed, and to minimize the handling of medication by the infirmary in preparation for dispensing to conserve medical staff resources.

Effect

Due to the present cumbersome methods of filling and dispensing meds, the 5:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. rounds are combined for inmates in some tanks in order to complete the two passes by end of shift. This compromises unit dose controls to prevent stockpiling or diversion, but usually not in sufficient quantities to cause an overdose of consequence.

Many inmates forget how frequently they are to take their medication, having been given no written instructions before or with the pass.

The excessive handling of pills and capsules can cause either an incorrect quantity of drugs to be placed into a medication envelope (supposed to be a day's supply), or an incorrect amount dispensed from the envelope to an inmate at a given pass (second time counted).

Records of drugs dispensed are not kept well because it is difficult to write on the envelopes and staff do not seem to have time to make this notation.

Delays occur in handling medication envelopes to locate meds for transferred inmates, to note dispensing, to keep them sorted properly by tank, and to prevent their being overturned and mixed.

Inherent delays in the system actually prolong the passage of each scheduled med to up to three hours. This further defeats the objective of unit dose controls and maximum effectiveness of medication.

Existing LVN staff work in pairs to dispense medication in a timely fashion, but this eliminates their availability for passing medication on weekends in lieu of Correctional Officers.

Correctional Officers are concerned about their liability for dispensing medication under a system that could allow them to give an incorrect drug or dosage without the opportunity to identify the drugs being dispensed and verify the prescription information authorizing its distribution to each individual.

Cause

- Present drug packaging methods require excessive handling by infirmary staff, decreasing available time of medical personnel to pass meds in lieu of Correctional Officers.
- The present record system is physically difficult to work with for efficient distribution of meds.
- The medication cart is too small to handle all medication stores needed during a pass, or is overstocked with liquid meds for lack of better storage arrangements in the infirmary.
- No written instructions for taking medications are given to inmates.

Recommendations

33. The Sheriff should conclude his review of the medication dispensing system with VMC staff and develop an improved design. The basic objective of the redesigned system should be to enhance the prescription preparation process in a way that reduces the possibility of dispensing errors to an absolute minimum. This design should also encompass streamlining the handling of drugs, an easier record system, written instructions to inmates for timely ingestion of meds, minimum discretion and clear instructions to Correctional Officers who pass medication in the absence of nurses, and strict adherence to use of the new identification system (see Finding 19).
34. An applicable procedure memorandum should be prepared to document the new system and promote its accurate application.
35. The medication cart should not be bulk stocked with more liquid medications than are needed for a given pass. This would help alleviate the possibility of theft when the misdemeanor dorm doors are opened to pass medication, or when the cart is passed too close to felony cells.
36. Pass through ports should be installed in misdemeanor dorm doors, in conjunction with identification windows, to allow passing medication to these inmates without opening the door to their tank.
37. Additional lockable cabinets should be provided in the infirmary, and a lock installed on the medication refrigerator, to further restrict the accessibility to expensive medications.

Department Comment

We agree. The medical staff shall prepare a written procedure for the dispensing of medication within the facility. This procedure

will be submitted to the division commander for review and approval. Additional medical staff has been requested in the fiscal year 1977-78 budget to ensure that qualified medical staff, and not Correctional Officers, control and dispense medications.

The Bureau has new medication carts on order of a more secure design.

14. MENU STANDARDS

The nutritional value and menu variety of the meals served at the Jail and Industrial Farm meet established standards.

Statement of Condition

The meals at the Jail and Industrial Farm are based on an 11-day cycle menu approved by the Health Department. This type of menu ensures a variety of balanced meals and allows the purchase of food in economical quantities.

Also, the use of heated serving carts to maintain proper food temperatures has enhanced the palatability of food served throughout the Jail.

According to the Health Department, menus at the Industrial Farm meet standards except for the need to increase the number of servings of fruits and vegetables to six per day instead of five, and to not serve dinner sooner than 5:00 p.m.

Criteria

The County Department of Health utilized State approved dietary standards (based on minimum jail standards) in evaluating menus for variety and nutritional value. The Health Department evaluation of October, 1976 indicates that the Jail meets these standards.

The Industrial Farm meets these standards except for the two minor exceptions noted above.

Effect

The serving of nutritional and varied meals is conducive to the proper health and behavior of inmates. It also has a positive effect on facility personnel who routinely eat one meal per day in

the officers mess.

Cause

The proper planning, purchasing, preparation and serving of food has been effectively carried out by facility personnel.

Recommendation

38. The current meal preparation procedures should be continued to ensure a consistent and acceptable standard of meal variety and nutrition.

Department Comment

We agree. Corrective action has been taken to solve the deficiencies as indicated by the CAO.

15. INMATE CORRESPONDENCE PLAN

The plan for processing incoming inmate mail should be revised and distributed to personnel at the Jail and Industrial Farm by the Bureau commander to ensure appropriate and uniform handling of all inmate correspondence to intercept contraband.

Statement of Condition

Regular and relief personnel do not have a copy of jail procedures for processing incoming or outgoing inmate mail, nor written guidelines enumerating the specific reasons jail personnel may review incoming or outgoing inmate correspondence for contraband and security purposes.

The practice of processing incoming inmate mail begins with a Jail Records Clerk in the Inmate Information Office noting the inmate's tank number on the correspondence. The correspondence is then taken to the accounting office by a Jail Records Clerk. He opens all mail, except legal correspondence, in the presence of an Account Clerk and searches it for contraband. He also removes all money and credits it to the account of the addressee inmate. When one clerk is absent, the other processes the mail alone.

If, on occasion, the need arises to open legal mail because something is felt inside the envelope, it is opened in the presence of the inmate

by a Correctional Officer.

After the regular mail is opened and searched, it is returned to the Inmate Information Office and picked-up by the elevator operator who distributes it to each floor. The floor officers then distribute the mail to the inmates.

Floor officers deliver outgoing inmate mail to the "M" Street officer who seals it without examining it for contraband and delivers it to the Inmate Information Office. There it is picked up by a Jail Records Clerk and taken to the accounting office to be sent to central services for stamping and mailing.

Criteria

According to Title 15 of the California Administrative Code, Minimum Standards for Local Detention Facilities, certain provisions should be included in an inmate correspondence plan prepared by a detention facility administrator.

The plan should recognize that inmates may correspond confidentially with the facility manager or administrator, with State and Federal courts, any member of the State Bar or holder of public office, and the State Board of Corrections, provided that jail authorities may open and inspect incoming or outgoing mail for contraband.

The plan should stipulate that those inmates without funds shall be permitted at least two postage-free letters each week to permit correspondence with family members and friends, but without limitation on the number of postage-free letters to his or her attorney and to the courts.

Chapter XIII of the State Department of Corrections Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of Local Detention Facilities states that legal mail, consisting of letters to and from inmates' attorneys of record, judges, and elected public officials, should be inspected for contraband, but should not be read or censored. "At times, it may be advisable to open incoming letters from these individuals in the presence of the addressee inmate to protect the privacy of these communications; the inmate should then be required to sign a receipt for such mail, indicating that the mail was unread and uncensored."

In addition, the plan should define what is meant by contraband and identify the jail personnel designated by the facility administrator to search inmate correspondence for contraband. The plan should also specify that all inmate mail should be processed in the presence of two jail personnel.

The types of negotiable instruments accepted for posting to inmate accounts should be strictly defined to prevent losses, or special procedures developed to prevent an inmate from drawing against credits for uncertified instruments until they have been collected.

Effect

Comprehensive procedures for personnel are needed to avert inaccurate processing of inmate mail. Inmate mail may be incorrectly sorted, incorrectly routed, and inadequately searched for contraband. Receipt of inmate money or property could also be incorrectly recorded, including the acceptance of bad checks.

Cause

A revised policy and procedures memorandum for processing inmate mail is needed to provide a system to assist staff in properly handling inmate correspondence.

Recommendations

39. The Bureau Commander should revise and distribute the policy and procedure memorandum for processing inmate mail to meet the requirements of Section 1151 of the Minimum Standards for Local Detention Facilities and meet the criteria for opening legal mail found in the Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of Local Detention Facilities.
40. The plan should also designate which personnel and for what reason each may be allowed to review inmate correspondence.
41. No fewer than two personnel should be present while inmate mail is processed to receipt funds and intercept contraband.

16. GUIDELINES FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION

Guidelines for disciplinary action for inmates who commit rule violations should be developed to ensure uniform and appropriate application of rules and disciplinary measures.

Statement of Condition

Presently, rule violations of inmates are punishable by varying degrees of disciplinary action for similar offenses, to a maximum of 10 days in solitary confinement with loss of privileges. This is a statewide standard maximum imposed by the California Administrative Code, Title 15, Section 1173.

Personnel reviewing violations to recommend or approve disciplinary action do not have written guidelines to appropriate punishments for specific types of violations. They must rely exclusively on experience and judgment, which while good, does not ensure uniformity from watch to watch or person to person. A review of records indicates some minor inconsistency in some instances.

Disposition of rule violations are reviewed by both the facility and Bureau commanders.

Criteria

Uniform application of appropriate discipline would be most equitable to inmates and ensure maximum benefit from disciplinary action. Essentially, the punishment should be in proportion to the severity of the incident.

Effect

Equitable administration of punishment, based upon published guidelines, protects Correctional Officers from possible accusations of excessive or improper use of discretionary discipline authority.

Inappropriate discipline can negate the effectiveness of the disciplinary effort. Inmates may be encouraged to violate more serious rules if they receive a lesser punishment than is appropriate for a violation or too severe a punishment for a minor violation.

Cause

Written disciplinary guidelines have not been developed to ensure the uniform and appropriate punishment of inmates.

Recommendation

42. A written policy of punishment suitable for various rule violations should be developed for use by employees designated

to prescribe discipline to inmates.

Department Comment

We agree. A set of standard disciplinary actions shall be established for violations of the rules as they are stated in the Inmate's "Facility Rules" pamphlet.

SECTION VI - INMATE BOOKING AND TRACKING

17. BOOKING AREA NOTIFICATION DEVICE

An intercom should be installed in the Booking area to allow Booking personnel to be alerted to the presence of an officer standing outside seeking entry.

Statement of Condition

The only way an officer outside of Booking has of notifying Booking personnel to open prebooking doors is by yelling or pounding on the plastic enclosed cell area. There is no device to notify Booking personnel of the need to activate the electric doors.

Criteria

An officer needing access to Booking should be able to contact Booking personnel in a reasonable manner so that they can operate security doors in a timely fashion.

Effect

The intake of inmates is unnecessarily delayed, Booking personnel unnecessarily aggravated, and patrol officers delayed by the current system.

Cause

A device to notify Booking of the need to operate security doors is not available.

Recommendation

43. An intercom should be installed for the use of officers between Booking and outside of the prebooking cell.

Department Comment

We agree. A communications system will be included in the remodeling of the basement area after evacuation of the existing kitchen area.

18. BOOKING PROCEDURES

Booking area practices should be modified to provide greater security and control of Booking activities.

Statement of Condition

Doors to the Booking area are frequently left open when personnel inside leave this area.

The outgoing inmate log is not adequately controlled by Booking personnel because of its location on a table outside of the Booking office. It is not readily visible to personnel inside and, consequently, is not monitored to ensure its accuracy. The Fresno Police Department log is also located on this table.

The table could be used as a weapon or result in injury to individuals if they were to strike the table during a scuffle.

Presently, if an inmate chooses to make a phone call, he dials the number himself, giving him the opportunity to dial long distance.

Officers bringing persons to be booked must check their weapons and then enter the prebooking corridor to deposit arrest forms. The checking of officers to ensure they are unarmed is not always effective.

Criteria

The Booking area should be kept as secure as possible by keeping doors locked except to allow access by Booking personnel.

The outgoing inmate log should be under the control and supervision of facility personnel to ensure that inmates temporarily leaving the Jail are accurately accounted.

The Fresno Police Department log book should be removed from its present location on a small table. This would allow the removal of the table so that the prebooking corridor would be clear of all obstructions.

Inmates should not be allowed to use the regular telephone for long distance calls and should be instructed to use the pay phone for long distance calls.

Arresting officers should not have to enter the prebooking area only to leave arrest forms.

Effect

Inmate access to the Booking area could result in the loss of inmate records and property, or facilitate an escape.

The table in the prebooking corridor could potentially become a weapon or obstacle that could cause injury to an individual during a scuffle.

Long distance phone calls are being made by prisoners at County expense.

Potentially armed officers are allowed into the prebooking area.

Cause

Booking personnel do not always comply with the facility policy of securing all doors to the Booking area.

The current practice of having a table in the prebooking area has not been perceived by facility personnel as a potential hazard.

The County phone provided for prisoner calls is not closely watched by Booking personnel when inmates initiate calls; inmates are not admonished not to attempt dialing long distance; and the feasibility of the telephone company modifying the phone to prevent long distance calls has not yet been fully investigated.

Potentially armed officers are routinely allowed into the prebooking corridor to give arrest forms to Booking personnel.

Recommendations

44. Booking personnel should be reminded of the importance of securing the Booking doors.
45. The outgoing inmate log should be kept on the counter at Booking, and the table removed.

46. The Fresno Police Department log should be kept outside the Booking area in the sally port next to the outside officer's door. The log could be kept in a small locked box attached to the wall.
47. Officers bringing persons to be booked, who have no other need to be inside the prebooking area than to leave arrest forms, should pass these forms through a slot in the wall to a Booking officer. Booking personnel should inspect the form for completeness and inquire about the medical condition of the prisoner. This should be done before allowing the arrested person to be placed in the prebooking cell.
48. Booking personnel should be instructed to more closely supervise inmates when they use the County phone in Booking. Inmates should be told to use only the pay phone for long distance calls, and not to attempt a long distance call on the regular phone. The feasibility of modifying this phone by the telephone company should also be pursued to determine the most cost effective method of controlling long distance calls.

Department Comment

We agree. Security requirements for the Booking area are constantly reviewed with officers working that area. Physical changes and changes in acceptance procedures will be accomplished after a procedure has been developed to screen the arrestee for injuries and check accompanying arrest forms for completeness. This change in procedure will require coordination with other agencies and will be accomplished.

19. PRISONER IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

The Sheriff's Department has developed, and is in the process of implementing, a prisoner identification system which should effectively discourage prisoners from trading identity papers to obtain another inmate's prescription drugs or to escape through the regular release process.

Statement of Condition

Jail personnel are alert to establishing prisoner identity prior to release, return of property, receipt of commissary purchases, or passage of medication. However, errors can and have been made (particularly by new employees not familiar with the inmates) under the current identification system.

Prisoners are now identified by a copy of their booking slip which they are to carry at all times. However, these papers wear-out after

several months, and can be traded among inmates. The principal tools Correctional Officers use to overcome these limitations are recognition by memory, and comparison of the physical description on the booking file to the individual presenting himself for release.

The Sheriff now has the equipment to prepare a photo identification card for each individual booked into the Jail. The cost of cards (.7¢), photo (7¢), and laminating material (11.7¢) will total approximately 20¢ per inmate, for about \$3,000 per year. These cards will be prepared by Booking officers, and be carried by prisoners until their release or transfer from custody. They are to be presented on demand to establish identity. Because of the laminating process, they cannot be altered by the inmates to trade identities.

Criteria

Sheriff personnel must have the capability to accurately identify inmates prior to inmate movement within the Jail to be able to avoid mixing hostile prisoners. Identification is also critical for dispensing medication to the correct individuals, distributing commissary purchases, return of property upon release or transfer, and clearing a release or transfer.

Effect

With the improved identification system, detention facility personnel will be much better equipped to accurately and safely perform their duties.

Cause

The new laminated-picture ID card is resistant to wear and alteration, and discourages exchange which has made previous systems vulnerable to abuse and unreliable.

Recommendation

49. That the Sheriff proceed with the implementation and enforcement of the new prisoner identification system. Phase in of the new system is critical to its success and should be carefully planned.

Department Comment

We agree. A new prisoner identification card is being issued to each prisoner. The card contains some vital identification

information and a color picture of the inmate. The card is laminated to prevent the inmate from tampering with the card.

20. INMATE CLASSIFICATION

The current classification system has been successful in separating inmates, who represent a threat to themselves and/or others, into appropriate security settings. Some adjustments in the system should be made to guarantee its continuing success.

Statement of Condition

Currently, inmates booked on felony charges are classified after charges are filed. Unsenteded felony inmates are classified for assignment to housing units with the use of a standard classification form.

Unsenteded misdemeanors are not classified because of a lack of alternative housing units. The possibility of a regional jail facility may permit the extension of the benefits of the classification program to all misdemeanor prisoners.

Senteded misdemeanors that become trusties are segregated from senteded misdemeanors that do not obtain trusty status. Trusties are currently assigned duties in the Jail or are sent to the Industrial Farm.

A record of trusty status is maintained on an unlabeled card file that is difficult to understand, particularly for an officer filling-in during the absence of the classification officer.

Inmate classification is now performed by one Correctional Officer assigned these duties full time and three Correctional Officers performing the function part time. This allows coverage eight hours a day, seven days a week.

Criteria

All inmates should be classified and assigned to the most appropriate area of the facility to the extent possible within the limits of the available housing units. This is necessary to ensure the safety of personnel and inmates.

As part of the classification process, all inmates should complete applicable sections of the classification form. This would allow the classification officer to be familiar with the total facility population and to be able to separate to protective custody units those misdemeanor, as well as felony, inmates that have a high probability of failure to mix with the other inmates.

Effect

Classifying inmates has reduced inmate assaults and abuses against other inmates which can also endanger facility personnel. From January, 1976 through June, 1976, there were 25 reported assaults among inmates. Since the classification system went into effect in July, 1976, there have been four reported assaults through December, 1976.

Cause

The present classification system probably segregates inmates to the maximum extent possible within the physical constraints of the current Jail facility. Watch sergeants and commanders, however, do not appear sufficiently familiar with this system to effectively supervise it or to assure continuity of the function in the absence of the trained classification officer.

Recommendations

50. The Department should give consideration to having all inmates on which charges are filed complete a classification form.
51. The trusty status card should be a printed form to indicate the meaning of information on the card to other officers as well as the classification officer.
52. An existing Correctional Sergeant should be assigned to supervise classification functions as one of the sergeant's assigned duties. This should ensure supervision and continuity to this important function.

Department Comment

The Bureau, simultaneously with the development of this finding, independently concluded it should assign two additional Correctional Officers to serve as part-time classification officers. This is to provide backup in the absence of the full-time classification officer, and to operate on a seven-day per week basis to avoid intake

tank crowding. The classification function has also been assigned to report to the Watch II commander.

CAO Response

The assignment of two additional Correctional Officers part-time to classification will help provide necessary backup for this function. See the finding on Bureau Organization regarding the level and responsibility of the supervisory position to which we recommend this function should report.

21. INMATE INFORMATION OFFICE

The Inmate Information Office could function more efficiently if it were remodeled, job descriptions updated, and additional training of Jail Records Clerks provided.

Statement of Condition

The study team asked Jail personnel to tally the numerous functions performed in the Inmate Information Office for a 24 hour period. The following is a summary of the data collected which illustrates the variety and volume of major activities performed there.

TYPE OF FUNCTION PERFORMED	Number of times function performed
Attorney Interviews (review identification, permit entry & exit of attorneys)	99
Doors (release door to permit entry and exit of authorized personnel & visitors)	731
Telephone calls (received and placed)	793
Intercom calls (received and placed)	123
Property and cash received for inmate at window	25
Number of inmate releases cleared	81
Number of warrent checks completed	134
Number of tags added & removed from board showing location of inmates within the jail	125
Court paperwork on inmates	174
Number of pieces of mail marked with cell number for delivery	225
Window - answer questions for visitors	61
TOTAL FUNCTIONS PERFORMED	2571

For the past calendar year, the turnover rate for Jail Records Clerks has been 25%. During this time, four Jail Records Clerks have resigned and one Jail Records Clerk has been dismissed.

Currently, the functions performed by Jail Records Clerks within the Inmate Information Office are handled at two locations. The first is at a desk behind a window covered by a heavy grate with two small openings. This clerk answers all public or agency inmate inquiries made either at the window or by telephone. Additionally, the clerk identifies that only authorized personnel enter or exit the Jail.

A second Jail Records Clerk sits at a desk in the rear of the office near buttons which release the exterior sally port door to enter and exit the Jail, and three interior sally port doors to go or return from, 1) the women's section or booking, 2) the elevator or, 3) the bondsmen and attorney interview area. Also, one of the lights which indicates a door is not secure has been burned out since the beginning of February.

The clerk at the rear desk generally handles all paperwork pertaining to the release of an inmate, computes release dates, types all inmate court work, and releases any one of four jail doors at the station when requested from the front desk clerk or someone knocking on a window. This permits entry and exit of Jail personnel and authorized visitors.

Until recently, a new Jail Records Clerk simultaneously assumed immediate responsibility for the back desk and trained solely on the job. However, as of July, 1976, a greater number of Jail Records Clerks were hired allowing more time to train the new clerks without the pressure of immediately assuming full desk responsibility.

In addition to on-the-job training, a clerk relies on a twelve page policy and procedure memorandum to prepare him for his job. This document details a few of the Inmate Information Office procedures. However, this memorandum does not identify all Jail policies and procedures for performing the required functions of the Inmate Information Office.

The existing layout of the Inmate Information Office hampers proper identification of individuals who enter and exit the facility. The absence of clearly posted signs detailing policies for entering the Jail and handling weapons leaves the authorized visitor sometimes

uninformed. Consequently, these two factors make it difficult for personnel to consistently follow existing policies and procedures. The facility's "no hostage policy" is lettered in black on the green sally port door.

Inmate Information Office personnel admit Correctional Officers and other authorized personnel into the Jail upon request. Jail personnel will generally request admittance by standing in front of the entry sally port door and calling out "front door".

Under the present office layout, this does not permit Inmate Information personnel to always visually identify the individual prior to pressing the button which releases the door and admits the individual. This practice also could allow unauthorized visitors, and does allow authorized personnel, to enter the facility without a security clearance check. Ordinarily, however, Jail personnel stand in front of the Inmate Information window or pass by the window, allowing themselves to be identified before requesting admittance.

Attorneys, bondsmen, other criminal justice personnel, and authorized visitors also enter the Jail through the Inmate Information Office entrance. Although Jail personnel could ask the authorized visitor if he is carrying a briefcase or weapon, this is not currently done, nor does the existing bond and attorney interview policy and procedure memorandum require this be done. Personnel do not currently inspect all briefcases when they are occasionally in a position to notice their presence. With the volume of people entering and exiting the facility, and the other responsibilities of Inmate Information Office personnel, such procedures are not practical under the present design of the entrance. Considerable delays would occur in admitting visitors, and Inmate Information personnel would be diverted from other duties.

Under the current layout of the office, even if a briefcase were opened for inspection, the heavy grate covering both of the Inmate Information windows obscures the ability of personnel to clearly see inside the briefcase. Additionally, the opening at both of the Inmate Information windows is very small and prevents passing a briefcase into the office to be inspected.

The Jail Records Clerk at the front desk hands out visitor passes through the opening in these windows once, 1) an individual is

identified, 2) he signs the visitor register, and 3) is logged in by the clerk. He is then admitted to the Jail.

The windows are also utilized by clerks in accepting all weapons which are not allowed in the Jail. The weapons are taken by the Jail Records Clerk and placed in a file box drawer which is then locked. The key is given to the owner of the weapon until he is prepared to leave the facility. Then the key is passed through the Inmate Information window to the clerk who unlocks the box and returns the weapon.

Criteria

The Jail Records Clerk turnover rate should be maintained at a more acceptable level of 5% to 10%. (The overall County rate is 16%). Many departments within the County maintain a rate under 10%.

The physical layout of the Inmate Information Office should allow Jail Records Clerks to effectively perform all the functions necessary to protect Jail security. This includes visual clearance of all persons prior to their entering or exiting the Jail through the Inmate Information Office sally port.

The layout should include posted signs in the Inmate Information Office clearly enumerating the policies for entry into the Jail and the policy for storing weapons which are not allowed in the facility. Additionally, the facility's "no hostage policy" should be more prominently posted for all visitors to read prior to entering the Jail.

The physical office layout and window openings should be designed to allow physical inspection of any breifcases or packages brought into the Jail.

All Inmate Information personnel should have memoranda on all Jail policies and procedures which affect their responsibilities in the Inmate Information Office. Refer to the study finding on Corrections Bureau Policy and Procedure Memoranda.

Also, Inmate Information personnel should have sufficient training to effectively perform their jobs. Training classes should include utilization of applicable memoranda and examples of errors frequently

made in the Inmate Information Office. Additional on-the-job training should be scheduled when sufficient personnel are on duty to perform the day to day functions as well.

Effect

The present layout of the Inmate Information Office is not conducive to proper enforcement of Jail entry policies. The location of the door controls causes constant interruptions in the office work flow which can result in clerical errors. Errors may vary from mistakes in entering court work on the inmate's permanent file, to inaccurately computing inmate release time.

The violation by Jail personnel of existing policies such as not wearing employee identification cards creates confusion for Jail Records Clerks, and requires them to utilize additional time to perform their duties.

Inadequately trained Jail Records Clerks commit clerical errors because of a lack of knowledge required for accurate job performance.

All these conditions have contributed to the high turnover rate among Jail Records Clerks.

Cause

- The present Inmate Information Office layout is inadequate. Problem features include the extremely small size of the room (10' X 12'); the inconveniently located door controls; the heavy grate covering the Inmate Information window which obscures vision; the absence of clearly posted signs detailing Jail access policies; and the inconspicuous display of the Jail's "no hostage policy".
- Written work descriptions are not current or complete.
- There is insufficient training of Jail Records Clerks.
- Policies are not being enforced.

Recommendations

53. The Inmate Information Office should be remodeled for effective visual screening of persons and physical

inspection of packages entering or exiting the Jail, provide a physical layout conducive to efficient operations, and allow control of all sally port doors.

54. Notices enumerating facility policies and procedures for handling weapons and obtaining access to the facility through the Inmate Information Office should be clearly posted upon entering the facility, and the facility's "no hostage policy" should be more prominently displayed.
55. To have well trained Jail Records Clerks functioning at all times, initial and periodic training should be provided for Inmate Information Office personnel. Copies of policies and procedures should be made available to each Jail Records Clerk and be utilized during training.
56. All policy and procedure memoranda related to the functions of the Jail Records Clerk should conform to recommendations made in the finding on Corrections Bureau Policy and Procedure Memoranda.
57. To protect Jail security, the existing bond and attorney interview screening policy and procedures memorandum should be revised to include all visitors entering the Jail.
58. The revision should also instruct personnel to inspect all briefcases and packages brought into the Jail by attorneys, bondsmen and visitors.
59. The memorandum should be distributed to all Jail personnel, bondsmen and locally practicing attorneys.

Department Comment

We agree. Physical changes in the office have been requested as a fiscal year 1977-78 budget item. The Bureau is being reorganized into several new sections. This reorganization will help to ensure that personnel working in this office receive more training and better supervision.

22. IN-CUSTODY AND BOOKING-RELEASE INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The Sheriff and the Computer Services Department should conduct a systems study of the Corrections Bureau's in-custody tracking and booking-release systems. This study should explore the feasibility and desirability of alternative system enhancements that would reduce duplication of staff efforts, improve accuracy, keep information more current, provide faster information processing and retrieval, and generate needed management information.

Statement of Condition

Basically, three units within the Jail generate, accumulate, and retrieve information on persons placed in custody with the Sheriff's Corrections Bureau. These units are the Inmate Information Office, Dispatch, and Booking.

The principal information mission of Booking is to collect intake information on persons turned over to the Corrections Bureau. This would include such data as name, address, charges pending, location of arrest and court jurisdiction, arresting agency, physical description, and release from custody. Dispatch maintains location status on each inmate and controls inmate movement. Inmate Information collects all the same data for its operations of tracking the legal status of the prisoner's detention, and to arrange legal visits, and adds court disposition information to each inmate's record.

There is of necessity a great deal of duplication of effort by these three units. Dispatch and Inmate Information both maintain index boards on inmate location, data sticks for which are prepared by Booking. All three maintain copies of booking forms on each inmate for future reference, and Inmate Information adds to this data file to update the legal status of each inmate. A great deal of intercom and phone conversations take place between the three units in clarifying or simply acquiring current data. Numerous other data inquiries are made for other agencies, inmates themselves, and the public.

For a recent 24 hour period, the following levels of activity were recorded for certain categories of information processing by these three offices:

	<u>Inmate Info.</u>	<u>Dispatch</u>	<u>Booking</u>
Bookings	--	89	90
Incoming Intercom Inquiries	116	157	103
Incoming Telephone Inquiries	704	138	69
Releases Processed	81	--	70
Inmates Added to Index Board	66	97	--
Inmate Location Changes	--	95	--
Attorney Interviews Arranged	99	--	--
Warrant Checks	134	--	--
Court Action Processed	174	--	--
Mark Mail with Inmate Tank Location	225	--	--

These offices have several other duties, such as frequent operation of sally port doors and observation of TV monitors, which distract them from their information generation, collection, retrieval and communications activities.

During our study we have noted several symptoms of difficulties with the current system. Job assignments in these three units are said to be sufficiently complex to require several months of training to develop a proficient employee. Numerous errors are made in posting data, and in keeping data current. The most serious consequence of these errors can be incorrect releases or improper detention of inmates. However, the Bureau invests an inordinate amount of time checking the accuracy of release and other data. Ordinarily errors are discovered and corrected in time. Until that release is processed, however, Inmate Information may be responding to inquiries with inaccurate data. Inmate Information frequently develops several hours of backlogs in updating information and processing the release of inmates.

Criteria

A desirable system of booking-release, and custody status and location information processing would have these features:

- A common data base to avoid duplication.
- Minimum number of points of data origin into the system, with input restricted to offices of primary data origin, to establish accountability for data accuracy.
- Rapid data base update and retrieval ("online").
- Screening of data accuracy at point of entry.
- Ease in generating timely, useful reports for management information needs such as court lists, release lists, facility utilization reports, and other data summaries.

Effect

There are numerous indications the current manual system of booking-release, and custody tracking are not functioning smoothly. Personnel requirements to operate the Inmate Information function have recently grown as inmate population has risen from 499 in 1975 to an average of 622 in 1976, up 25%. There is increasing management dissatisfaction with the accuracy and performance of the units

operating these manual systems.

Cause

Increased information demands resulting from the growth of the Jail population are placing strains on the current system.

Recommendations

60. That the Sheriff and the Computer Services Department review the Bureau's current information system to define requirements and pinpoint any shortcomings.
61. That they explore alternative system enhancements to determine the most cost-effective solution to any current system shortcomings they identify.

Department Comment

With the cooperation of the Computer Services Department, the Sheriff intends to review recent developments in automated jail information systems in other Counties. Both departments are aware of a new system being developed and installed in San Joaquin County with LEAA funds using microcomputer technology. They intend to examine this system as well as other alternatives.

SECTION VII - PHYSICAL SECURITY

23. BOOKING SALLY PORT DOORS

The inoperable sally port doors on the booking area ramp should be replaced with sliding doors.

Statement of Condition

The ramp doors are an overhead type, designed to roll down to the floor of the passageway to provide a security barrier. The existing two sally port doors at either end of the driveway (ramp) are not operable because of accidents with transporting vehicles, and have not been used for approximately two years. Because of this deficiency, the transfer of inmates between transporting vehicles and the prebooking cell is accomplished without the area being securely enclosed. Escapes have occurred, and unsuccessful attempts have been made, because of this opportunity. Injuries to personnel and prisoners can occur in an escape attempt or the resulting pursuit.

Criteria

The drive-in ramp area immediately outside of Booking should be secured when inmates are transferred between the prebooking holding cell and transporting vehicles. This is necessary to prevent inmates, including those already in the prebooking cell or who are in the process of being transferred there from a transporting vehicle, from having the opportunity to escape while the holding cell outer door is open.

Sliding doors on the ramp would be more visible and durable than the existing overhead roll-up type and would minimize the possibility of accidental contact with a vehicle. Some warning device and safety equipment should also be installed to safely operate the doors and avert repeated damage.

Effect

The probability of inmate escape attempts is much greater without the presence of sally port barriers on external jail doors.

Cause

The existing ramp sally port doors have not been repaired because of the high cost involved and the continued likelihood of accidents involving vehicles in this area under the present design of the doors.

Recommendations

62. The booking ramp sally port doors should be replaced during the 1977-78 fiscal year, with controls and safety equipment to ensure their use and to prevent damage. The cost of replacing the doors with a sliding type door is estimated to be comparable to repairing the ramp doors (approximately \$11,000).
63. The installation of an electric eye and warning lights would also be beneficial in safely operating the door and averting damage (cost approximately \$3,000).

Department Comment

We agree. The request for installation of two sally port doors has been submitted as a budget request item for fiscal year 1977-78. The doors will have safety devices to help prevent damage from vehicular collision.

24. SAFETY EQUIPMENT

Safety helmets suitable for use in a detention facility should be worn by Correctional Officers when they are assigned to quell major disturbances in the Jail.

Statement of Condition

Currently safety helmets are not used by Correctional Officers in quelling disturbances in the Jail. The only available helmets are located in the Law Enforcement Administration Building. Those helmets are not well designed for combative situations that could be experienced in the Jail because they could be pulled over an officer's head by an inmate. The helmet strap could then choke the officer, or the helmet could be pulled over the officer's face blocking his vision.

Other safety equipment such as batons are available in sufficient numbers (25 in the Sergeant's office), and Correctional Officers are receiving training in their use. Approximately 30 Correctional Officers do not have flashlights or whistles, but 50 of each have

been requested in the 1977-78 budget. Approximately 13 handcuffs are currently available to Correctional Officers. These are issued to Correctional Officers who have a regular need to use them. This includes Correctional Officers working with inmates classified as highly dangerous who must be handcuffed when moved within the Jail, and inmates taken to Valley Medical Center who must be handcuffed while being transported.

Criteria

Adequate and reasonable safety equipment should be available to minimize the possibility of injury to jail personnel during a disturbance. Properly designed safety helmets should be issued to Correctional Officers for limited immediate use. Approximately 15 helmets would be sufficient.

Effect

Correctional Officers could suffer injury without helmets.

Cause

The occasions when helmets are needed in the Jail are infrequent and the need has not been perceived as a significant one.

Recommendation

64. Approximately 15 helmets suitable for use in the Jail should be acquired for use by Correctional Officers on occasions when disturbances must be forcefully terminated to protect inmates, staff, and County property.

Department Comment

We agree. The Bureau is researching different suppliers to determine the most suitable type of helmet. When a helmet design has been selected, the helmets will be purchased from existing funding.

25. ATTORNEY INTERVIEW ROOM SECURITY

The camera surveillance, intercom and buzzer system, and configuration of the "attorney interview room" need redesign to provide security for visitors and staff.

Statement of Condition

There is an interview room located inside the Jail at the Inmate Information entrance to the facility. It is used by attorneys for purposes of interviewing inmate clients. Probation and parole officers, and officers of some police agencies, also use this area to interview inmates. Because of attorney-client privileged communication, no microphone surveillance of this room is maintained to detect disturbances.

The room is divided into two modules of four interview booths each. There is one camera position inside the interview room which is focused on the door through which prisoners enter and exit the interview room. That door is ordinarily operated remotely from the "M" Street security station when it is manned. When the security station is not manned, an officer must accompany the inmate through the prisoner visiting holding area to open the door by key. In those cases, that officer does not have the opportunity to observe the TV monitor before opening the door as would the "M" Street security station officer. There is also an intercom next to that door through which interviewers may summon an officer to retrieve the inmate at the conclusion of an interview. When that officer is occupied, prisoners and interviewers can be detained for as long as 20 minutes.

The door through which interviewers enter and exit the interview room is operated remotely from the Inmate Information Office upon request from the visitor through the same intercom. There is no camera surveillance of that door and an inmate could be passed through it by mistake into the sally port vestibule (which has happened). At that point, he would be one door away from escape.

With no sound surveillance and one camera angle, facility staff cannot monitor what transpires within the interview booths. An interviewer could be assaulted, identities exchanged, or weapons or other contraband transferred.

Officers conduct a pat search of inmates before and after each interview visit to check for contraband.

Criteria

Surveillance of the interview room should be adequate to detect assaults on visitors, clothing or other contraband exchanges, and

escape attempts. Positive identification should be made of an interviewer seeking to exit the interview room before Inmate Information releases the door into the sally port vestibule which includes the watch commander's office. The interview room door should also be viewed before a visitor is passed into the interview room from the sally port.

Effect

The level of surveillance of the attorney interview room is not adequate to ensure the safety of interviewers and facility staff.

Cause

The attorney interview room was not designed to allow a level of surveillance to detect assaults on interviewers, or escape attempts.

Recommendations

65. The Sheriff should consider redesigning the attorney interview room to allow complete visual inspection of the room with a minimum of camera monitor positions. We suggest that the booth walls and partitions be removed and replaced with tables, and one camera be added to give complete visual surveillance of the room.
66. The attorney interview room door into the Inmate Information sally port should be observable on a TV monitor in Inmate Information, and checked before the door is released into the sally port.
67. The Sheriff should consider the possibility of installing "panic buttons" in several areas of the interview room to draw officer attention to the TV monitor(s) in an emergency.

SECTION VIII - PROCEDURAL SECURITY

26. INDUSTRIAL FARM KEY SETS

Employees at the Industrial Farm using an assigned set of keys on a regular basis should have key sets securely attached to their belts.

Statement of Condition

Presently, key sets are issued to individual employees based on need. These employees use the keys on a daily basis.

Keys to most doors in the compound and the front gate (except food storage, pharmacy, and holding cell) are on these sets. Keys are currently carried in pockets or clipped on belts.

Criteria

The control of access to various areas of the Industrial Farm is necessary to control inmate activity and the use of farm property. This is necessary to prevent fraternization between the male and female inmates; prevent contraband from being brought into the main compound at night; and control inmate activity at night when fewer Correctional Officers are present to provide supervision.

Effect

The current method of carrying keys increases the possibility that keys will be misplaced and could, therefore, be available for use by inmates. The loss of keys, if not found, could result in the need to rekey locks and reissue new keys to all personnel.

Cause

Not all Industrial Farm employees have been issued key holders for use in fastening and carrying key sets securely on their belts.

Recommendation

68. Employees issued key sets should be required to have them securely attached to their belts. This procedure would significantly reduce the possibility of keys being misplaced.

Department Comment

We agree. A plan is presently being implemented to increase key control and security at the Industrial Farm.

27. SEARCH TEAM DUTIES

The current search team activities are beneficial to Jail security. Results of search efforts should be made known to affected jail personnel.

Statement of Condition

The search team (consisting of two Correctional Officers) currently conducts unscheduled searches of different cell areas on a daily basis. Areas to be searched are picked at random or selected based upon information obtained from floor officers. The team also notes other structural security discrepancies in and around the detention facility. Actual results of search efforts are not routinely made available to affected personnel, although written reports are prepared on a daily basis describing the area searched and the contraband found. Copies of these reports are given to the facility commander.

Presently, the search team reports to the watch sergeants and the facility commander.

Criteria

The current duties of the search team are important and appear to be conducted in an effective manner.

Because of its mobility in passing through the facility, the search team has the unique opportunity to frequently review the physical security requirements of the Jail. Written reports of specific instances of deficiencies in structural security and results of searches should be given to the supervisor of the team and the facility commander.

Results of searches should be made available at briefings so that affected personnel are aware of search results and can deal with inmates in a safer manner and more effectively control contraband.

Effect

The use of the search team is an effective method of reducing the amount of contraband in the Jail and significantly increasing the safety of all inmates and facility personnel. Its effectiveness in improving facility security could be enhanced if search findings were disseminated more widely to personnel.

Cause

The present search team was only recently (approximately November 1) reactivated to conduct searches. It was suspended for approximately three months prior to that time because of other priority uses of personnel.

The team was instituted to address the major concern of contraband (particularly weapons and narcotics) among inmates, and has performed this objective well.

Recommendation

69. Reports of contraband discovered during searches should be made available to Correctional Officers during briefings.

28. KEY INVENTORY

A key inventory should be conducted on a regular basis, at least monthly, to ensure that all keys are accounted for and that assigned keys are on the proper key sets.

Statement of Condition

Records indicate a key inventory of the total number of keys in the Jail by key number was performed in October, 1976; November, 1976; and for January, 1977.

The inventories did not verify the accuracy of the key log which shows which keys are assigned to each key set.

The Industrial Farm conducts an inventory on a monthly basis by comparing individual key sets to records maintained on a card file.

Criteria

Key control is essential for ensuring the security of the Jail and Industrial Farm. Keys should only be in the possession of those personnel with a need to use them on a regular basis as set forth in the key control plan.

Effect

Prisoners could acquire misplaced/lost keys without the knowledge of facility personnel and have uncontrolled access to various areas of the detention facilities. This could result in a reduction of control over inmates or possibly result in an escape.

Possession of more keys than is necessary for the area assignment of Bureau personnel makes them more attractive hostages for attempted escapes.

Cause

An inventory of keys has not been performed on a regular basis. When inventories have been performed, key sets have not been checked to ensure that assigned keys are on the proper sets.

Recommendation

70. Keys should be physically inventoried on a regular basis (at least monthly) to account for all keys and ensure the proper assignment of keys to key sets.

Department Comment

We agree. The suggestions as set forth by the CAO have been implemented.

29. SECURITY FOR PASSAGEWAY TO THE WOMEN'S SECTION

Procedures should be established to require female Correctional Officers and female inmates or visitors to obtain clearance from the person monitoring the corridor between the Inmate Information Office and the Women's Section before entering the passageway.

Statement of Condition

On occasion the doors to the misdemeanor dormitories are open and inmates are in the corridor between the Inmate Information Office and the Women's Section. This sometimes occurs when female officers

transport female inmates to and from Booking, or when visitors are enroute between the Women's Section and Inmate Information.

There are three cameras to monitor the corridor area outside the misdemeanor dormitories between the Inmate Information Office and the Women's Section.

The Women's Section has an intercom to contact Dispatch on the second floor, and a telephone to call all locations within the Jail. These means do not provide rapid and convenient communications between the Women's Section and the rest of the Jail.

Criteria

The "M" Street security station officer monitoring the corridor should be contacted whenever female personnel and female inmates or visitors desire to pass through the corridor. That officer should check the television monitors to ensure the corridor is empty, and check the door controls to determine that the dormitory doors are secured. He should then advise them whether the corridor is secure. This would reduce the likelihood of an individual being assaulted in the corridor by inmates.

Effect

The presence of females in the corridor, particularly when dormitory doors are open, presents an unnecessary risk to female correctional personnel and female inmates, or visitors who are enroute to or from the Women's Section.

Cause

This situation has not been perceived as serious enough to warrant additional communications devices or specific procedures to maximize the safety of individuals passing through this area.

Recommendations

71. Procedures should be established so personnel monitoring the corridor cameras and dormitory doors between the Inmate Information Office and Women's Section are contacted to ensure that it is clear of unescorted inmates and that dormitory doors are secure.
72. The Women's Section or the Inmate Information Office should be notified that someone is coming through this area to be

alert to detect a disturbance if they are delayed.

73. The feasibility of installing intercom communication between the Women's Section and the Inmate Information Office and the "M" Street security station officer should be explored to facilitate the procedure recommended above.

Department Comment

We agree. The monitor equipment has been requested as a budget item for the fiscal year 1977-78 budget. The Bureau is presently in the process of looking into the feasibility of the intercom system.

30. VIDEO TAPING OF DISTURBANCES

The video tape recording capabilities of the new equipment in Dispatch should be utilized to record and store for evidence any disturbance which occurs within view of the facility's closed circuit cameras.

Statement of Condition

When the second floor of the Jail was remodeled, video tape recording equipment was installed in the Dispatch office. There are also numerous television monitors in that office which are tuned to cameras located on each floor. The video tape equipment may be used to record what transpires within view of any of the cameras switched onto those monitors.

The video tape equipment came with one tape cassette cartridge. No other cartridges have been acquired.

Criteria

The Dispatch officer should utilize the video tape equipment to record all disturbances within view of the closed circuit cameras. This material may then be used to assist in prosecuting inmates for crimes committed in Jail, and to substantiate disciplinary isolation.

Effect

When a recording is made of an incident, the cassette is left in the machine in case another disturbance occurs and its recording is in order. This usually happens after the original recording has been replayed several times for viewing by supervisors. However,

the next recording may be made over the earlier one on the tape, resulting in the erasure of the earlier recording.

Cause

There are no spare video tape cassettes available to replace a cartridge which contains a recording that the Sheriff may want to save.

Recommendations

74. That the Sheriff purchase spare video tape cassettes for use in the Dispatch office.
75. That the facility commander review each recording, and that cassettes be re-used (erasing older recordings) only upon written authorization of the commander. This should ensure that valuable recordings are not inadvertently erased prematurely.

Department Comment

We agree. Additional tapes will be purchased from existing funding. Retention procedures will be established upon receipt of the additional tapes.

31. PRISONER COUNT PROCESS

The procedures for counting inmates should be revised to provide greater inmate accountability to detect escapes or incorrect releases in time to enhance the chances for recapture.

Statement of Condition

Currently, Watch I (morning shift) conducts head counts at 11:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. Watch II conducts head counts at 7:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. Watch III conducts a roll count at 9:00 p.m.

The time between counts on Watch I is five hours; between counts on Watch I and II is three hours; Watch II is six hours; Watch II and Watch III is eight hours; and Watch III and Watch I is two hours.

The roll call count is conducted at 9:00 p.m. after inmate visiting is concluded. Trusty dorms and trustees at work assignments in the Jail, such as the kitchen, are not counted during the Watch II 1:30 p.m. count.

Criteria

The interval between counts should be as random and frequent as practical to ensure inmate accountability.

All inmates, including trustees within the Jail, should be included in each count.

Inmate counts should be conducted at least twice during each watch, once at the beginning to ensure accountability between watches, and then at an irregular time during the watch to detect escapes.

A roll count should be conducted at least twice a day to ensure that inmates in custody are the same individuals as the records indicate should be present.

Effect

Unnecessarily long periods between counts minimize the effectiveness of the count process to detect escapes in a timely fashion. Trustees, who have a much greater degree of movement in the Jail, have a better opportunity to escape without detection.

Not verifying the number of inmates at the beginning of shifts results in additional difficulty in verifying a count conducted several hours into a watch.

Not having an up-to-date written count procedure permits variations in the count process among personnel, with resulting errors and confusion.

Cause

Current procedures should be revised to ensure maximum effectiveness of the count process.

Recommendations

76. Count times should be modified so that a count is conducted at the beginning of each watch and again at an irregular time during each watch, except Watch II where the second (roll) count should continue to be conducted at 9:00 p.m.
77. Watch II should conduct a roll count around 12:30 p.m.

78. All inmates actually in the Jail at the time of a count, including trustees, should be counted.
79. Uniform procedures should be promulgated in a revised policy and procedure memorandum.

Department Comment

We agree that an additional name roll call would be desirable. However, a roll call at 12:30 p.m. would not be practical. An investigation to ascertain the optimum time frame for the additional count is underway.

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